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THE IMPACT OF MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE ON THE LAW
RELATING TO PRENATAL INJURIES *
Until recently, teratology, the study of congenital malformations-
here defined as gross structural defects '-has been a somewhat neglected
field of medicine.2 The apathetic state of medical research in this area was
the natural result of the now discredited belief that all congenital anomalies
are of hereditary origin.3  It was thought that the fetus,4 protected from
environmental influences by maternal inclosure, develops in a state of
uterine bliss.5 It followed from this belief that teratological research was
thought to have little besides eugenic significance. The fundamental error
of this position has now been dramatically exposed. 6 In the 1940's, three
catalytic developments-a German measles epidemic in Australia, research
on the inheritance of the Rh factor in fetal blood, and the bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki-irnplicated environment as a cause of congenital
malformation and spurred research in this field. This history helps to
explain the great strides taken by the science of teratology in the last few
* Abbreviations of medical and scientific periodicals cited herein conform to In-
dex Medicu..
1 Fraser, Causes of Congenital Malformations in Human Beings, 10 J. CHRON.
Dis. 97 (1959) ; Warkany & Kalter, Congenital Malformations (pts. 1-2), 265 NEw
ENGL. J. MED. 993, 1046 (1961). Congenital deformities and microscopic structural
defects are thus excluded from this definition. Compare DORLAND, MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY 792 (23d ed. 1957), which also includes "deformity" within its definition of
malformation; Warkany & Kalter, supra at 1050, implying that "deformities" come
within their definition. For a discussion of congenital deformities in this context, see
text accompanying notes 108-18 infra.
2
Warkany, Etiology of Congenital Malformations, 2 ADVANCE PEIAT. 1 (1947).
See generally AEy, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 182-91 (6th ed. 1954); PATTEN,
HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 219-32 (2d ed. 1953).
3 See MINTz, ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON PRENATAL DEVELOPMENT 1-2
(1958).
4 The developing organism is more properly called an embryo during the first
two months after conception, DORLAND, MEDICAL DICTIONARY 439 (23d ed. 1957), but
for purposes of this Note no such distinction need be made.
5 MINTz, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1-2; Montagu, Constitutional and Prenatal
Factors in Infant and Child Health, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE HEALTHY PERSONALITY,
SUPP. II: PROBLEMS OF INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD 148, 152 (Senn ed. 1950).
6 See W'Ams, OBSTETRICS 1070 (1lth ed. Eastman 1956) ; Ingalls, Causes and
Prevention of Developmental Defects, 161 A.M.A.J. 1047-48 (1956). It had long
been observed that irradiation administered close to the abdomen of a pregnant woman
could cause abortion and defects such as microcephalus in the child. See MURPHY,
CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS 87 (2d ed. 1947); POTTER, PATHOLOGY OF THE FETUS
AND THE NEWBORN 139 (1952); Montagu, supra note 5, at 157-58; Roland & Wein-
berg, Radiation Effect on the Unborn Embryo Immediately After Conception, 62 AMER.
J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 1167 (1951). This observation, however, did not stimulate a
great deal of research. For malpractice cases on this point, see note 172 infra and
accompanying text.
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years and the resulting rapid emergence of a new field of medicine, here
termed antenatal pediatrics. It also casts light on some recent developments
in the law of torts dealing with prenatal injuries and calls for increasing
awareness by lawyers and law scholars of what medicine now knows and
does not know about why some children are born with imperfect bodies or
minds.
It is now known that congenital defects can result from heredity, from
environmental factors-any causative agent other than those present as the
sole result of inheritance from the parents-, or from a complex interaction
between the two.7 The fetus can be adversely affected by environment
either directly, through gross mechanical injury 8-usually a strong blow
inflicted upon the mother's abdomen-, or indirectly, through the mother.
The latter process can result from a causative agent initially within the
mother or from the mother's exposure to some external factor, the effects
of which are transmitted through her to the fetus.9 In most cases this
transmission operates through the placenta-the bridge between the fetal
and maternal circulatory systems which serves to transport nutriment and
respiratory gases to the fetus.'0 Imbalances in the mother's circulation can
have an effect on the fetus; "1 the resulting change in intrauterine environ-
ment can cause difficulties ranging from prenatal death to minor congenital
defects. Beyond these general propositions, however, much remains un-
known; 12 in most cases it is impossible to isolate the exact cause of a par-
ticular defect.
7 See generally MoRisox, FOETAL AND NEONATAL PATHOLOGY 15 (1952) ; Fraser
& Fainstat, Causes of Congenital Defects, 82 AMER. J. Dis. CmwL. 593 (1951);
Gruenwald, Mechanisms of Abnormal Development, 44 ARcH. PATH. 398 (1947);
Penrose, Heredity and Environment in the Causation of Foetal Malformation, 166
PRAcTIoNER 429 (1951); Stein, Anomalies of Genetic Origin, 5 PEDIATRcs 324
(1950); Warkany & Kalter, supra note 1. At the present time it is thought that
most congenital malformations result from the third process. Fraser, supra note 1,
at 100; Fraser & Fainstat, supra at 596-97; Penrose, supra at 434-35.
8 Gross mechanical injury as such rarely leads to malformation; if the force is
strong enough to penetrate the protecting envelope, abortion will usually occur. See
PATTEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 230 (2d ed. 1953) ; Gruenwald, supra note 7, at 415.
9 See Gruenwald, supra note 7, at 403. See generally Desmond, Franklin, Blattner
& Hill, The Relation of Maternal Disease to Fetal and Neonatal Morbidity and
Mortality, 8 PrFDAT. CLIN. N. AmuT. 421 (1961) ; Stott, Physical and Mental Handi-
caps Following a Disturbed Pregnancy, [1957] 2 LANCET 1006; Warkany, Some
Factors in the Etiology of Congenital Malformations, 50 AMER. J. MFENT. Dac. 231
(1945).
10 See MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 47-56 (1962); WINDLE, AsPHYxIA
NEONATORIUM: ITS RELATION TO THE FETAL BLOOD, CIRCULATION AND RESPIRATION
AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE BRAIN 3-6 (1950). See also Montagu, supra note 5, at
152-53; Potter, Placental Transmission of Viruses, 74 AMa. J. Oasr. & GYNEC.
505 (1957). For an analysis of the fetal-maternal relationship, see PATTEN, HUMAN
EMBRYOLOGY 153-66 (2d ed. 1953).
11 See AmEY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 138-39 (6th ed. 1954) ; MONTAGU, PRE-
NATAL INFLUENcES 48-49, 377 (1962).
12 See AREx, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 184 (6th ed. 1954) ; Fraser, supra note 1,
at 99; Warkany, supra note 2, at 49-50. Furthermore, the reliability of experimental
results is often open to question. See Saiger, Errors of Medical Studies, 173 A.M.A.J.
678 (1960). For a discussion of the various experimental procedures, see Fraser,
supra note 1, at 100-08.
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Contemporaneous with the rapid expansion of knowledge about con-
genital malformations has been a complementary legal development of
major significance. Beginning in 1946 with Bonbrest v. Kotz,13 many
courts, overturning a long line of decisions stemming from the famous
opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Dietrich v. Northampton,4 have recog-
nized a cause of action for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries. In most
states that have recently considered the question, this right of action has
been upheld,' 5 at least if the injuries were suffered by the fetus after it
reached viability,'0 the final period of intrauterine development, from ap-
proximately the twenty-sixth week of pregnancy, during which a fetus is
capable of independent existence if prematurely separated from the
mother.'7 Some courts have allowed actions for the similarly caused death
of a fetus or child.'3 On the whole, the courts have not treated these
1365 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). The first decision in a state court of last
resort to allow recovery was Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W2d 838
(1949) (death action).
'4 138 Mass. 14 (1884). See notes 24-25 infra and accompanying text. The
decision has since been limited to deaths of nonviable fetuses. Keyes v. Construction
Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960).
'5 E.g., Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14
(Super. Ct 1955) ; Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d
909 (1951) ; Rodriquez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953). Evidently the
American Law Institute has not had its ear to the ground; despite revisions of the
Restatement of Torts in 1948 and 1954, it still insists that "a person who negligently
causes harm to an unborn child is not liable to such child for the harm." RESTATE-
mENT, TORTS § 869 (1934).
16 Darnasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1950) ; Woods v. Lancet,
303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951) ; Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d
225 (1955) ; see Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953) ; Annot, 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950).
Some courts have specifically rejected the viability rule. See note 65 infra and accom-
panying text
17 See POTTER & ADAm, FETAL AND NEONATAL DEATH 82 (2d ed. 1949); WI.-
LIAMS, OBsT ics 513 (11th ed. Eastman 1956). Medical terminology does not
classify fetuses by means of a "viability" and "nonviability" distinction but by weight
A child weighing from 400 to 999 gms. at birth is termed "inunature" ; most immature
infants do not survive birth and are therefore considered nonviable by the law. A child
weighing from 1000 to 2500 gms. (5'A lbs.) at birth is described as "premature";
premature infants are capable of surviving birth-the later the separation, the better
the chances-and are therefore considered viable by the law. See generally MONTAGU,
PRENATAL INFLUENCES 398-99 (1962). Of course, a "viable" child may die at birth
or afterwards due to previously inflicted prenatal injuries.
IS See Annot, 10 A.L.R.2d 639 (1950). Courts differ as to whether it is necessary
for a child to survive birth in order for a death action to lie. Stidam v. Ashmore,
109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959), held over a vigorous dissent that survival
is not necessary; accord, Hale v. Manion, 368 P2d 1 (Kan. 1962); Verkennes v.
Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). Contra, Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co.,
155 Neb. 77, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951). The cases denying relief are approved by 2
HARPER & JAmms, TORTS § 18.3, at 1031 (1956). Except perhaps in the two states
where the basis of recovery for death is wholly punitive, ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 123
(1960), Gulf, M. & 0. Ry. v. Williams, 251 Ala. 516, 38 So. 2d 334 (1949); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1961) ; see McCoRmIcK, DAMAGES § 103 (1935),
courts are not compelled to allow recovery for prenatal death. On the basis of
legislative intent, however, limiting recovery to surviving infants is no more justi-
liable than a similar distinction between viable and nonviable fetuses. See text fol-
lowing note 57 infra. Moreover, in a death action it is the parents that are claiming
compensation, not the fetus. As long as the parents are recognized to have a com-
pensable interest in the case of death caused by prenatal injuries where the infant
initially survives birth, there is no reason why recovery should be denied in stillbirth
cases. The essential interest in both situations is the expectation of the parents; in
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two causes of action differently.19 Although a death action is technically
a new cause of action brought on behalf of the decedent's relatives or
estate-unlike a survival action where any cause of action the decedent had
before his death "survives" to his estate 2 -the courts have tended to
construe as "derivative" those death statutes that are not explicit on this
point21 to the extent no cause of action lies in favor of the estate unless
the infant had a cause of action at the time of his death.22  Thus, the
those cases where recovery is allowed, it, in effect, compensates for emotional distress
resulting from frustration of this expectation. While the mental anguish of the
parents may be greater in situations where they actually see the child before its death
-but courts requiring survival do not even mention this consideration, denying relief
to estates of nonsurviving fetuses simply on a derivative construction of the wrongful
death act, see note 22 infra and accompanying text-, it is questionable whether the
survival requirement realistically reflects this distinction. In many cases the infant
may live for such a short time that the parents do not see him; from the standpoint
of parental emotions such cases are no different from stillbirth cases, yet the "survival"
courts would treat them differently. In view of the relevant underlying interest, the
expectancy of the parents, the fact that the parents did not observe their child dying
would seem to bear upon the measure of damages rather than liability itself. The
absurdity of drawing the line of liability at survival is pointedly illustrated by the
recent action of a Pennsylvania court in granting letters of administration to the
estates of two of a set of triplets while denying them as to the third; all three were
allegedly killed by prenatal injuries sustained in an automobile accident, but while
two survived birth for a few minutes, the third was stillborn. Evening Bulletin
(Philadelphia), Feb. 15, 1962, p. 28, col. 5. A significant recent case in its holding
that a husband has a cause of action against a physician who performed an illegal
abortion on his wife has avoided the issue of survival under the death statute by
recognizing the real interest which is at stake-a marital interest in the expectation
of children. Touriel v. Benveniste, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2203 (Cal. Super. Ct Oct. 20,
1961).
19 There are, however, distinctions. A death action may not have the emotional
appeal that an action brought by the child for prenatal injuries does. Also, damages
are easier to estimate in an action for injuries. Neither of these distinctions is
currently emphasized by the courts, however, since the child would have had a right
of action if he had survived and since it is clear that a wrongful death action would
lie if the child had been killed by a tortious act immediately after birth. The old
rule limiting the recovery of the estates of minors to their "pecuniary loss!' arising
from the death, see McCoRmicic, DAMAGES § 101 (1935), which if strictly enforced
in the past would have resulted in the denial of recovery in almost all cases-a minor
is usually an economic liability-is currently being abandoned. See Hord v. National
Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D.D.C.), af'd per curiam, 204 F.24 397
(D.C. Cir. 1953) (infant killed immediately after birth) : "[The fact that an infant
has not yet developed an earning capacity is] . . . no reason for not awarding sub-
stantial damages. . . . Otherwise, the purpose of the statute would be frustrated
to that extent and a person who negligently caused the death of an infant would be
free of all liability. Such a result would be abhorrent and unjust. It would 'keep
the word of promise to our ear, and break it to our hope'." Cf. Van Beeck v. Sabine
Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1937) (Cardozo, J.): "Death statutes have their
roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of the law . . . . It would be a mis-
fortune if a narrow or grudging process of construction were to exemplify and
perpetrate the very evils to be remedied." See generally WRONGFUL DEATH AND
SuRvivoRSHiP 19-26 (Beall ed. 1958).
20 See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 24.1-.7 (1956); PRossER, TORTS
§105 (2d ed. 1955).
21 Compare Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.130 (1959) ("Whenever the death of a person
results from . . . negligence . . . damages may be recovered for the death from
the person who caused it . . . ."), with ME. REv. STAT. AwN. ch. 165, § 9 (1954)
(recovery allowed if the misconduct would have "entitled the party injured to main-
tain an action and recover damages [if he had lived] . . . ."). The Maine statute
was modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, see Picard v. Libby, 152 Me. 257, 127 A.2d
490 (1956). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 24.4 (1956).
22 See Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953) ; Keyes v. Construc-
tion Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) ; Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo.
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fundamental question in suits of either type is the same: whether the
infant has, or had before his death, a cause of action for prenatal injuries
negligently inflicted. The impact of medical advances upon the historical
development of such a cause of action is discussed in section I of this Note,
together with the "viability rule"; section II will consider the scope of
liability; and section III, the problems of cause-in-fact in medicine and law,
and the adaptability of the rules of evidence to recent medical theories in
prenatal injury cases.
I. THE CAUSE OF ACTION
A. The Impact of Medicine on the Development of a Cause of Action
The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Dietrich
v. Northampton 23 was the first to deal significantly with the question of
whether an action would lie for the negligent infliction of prenatal injuries
upon a fetus.2 4 A woman about five months pregnant fell on defendant's
highway, went into premature labor, and gave birth to an infant which
survived for only fifteen minutes. In the resulting wrongful death action
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, stated that since no precedent
existed for allowing such an action for prenatal injuries,2 5 the common
law provided no remedy for such injuries. Since the relationship between
the mother's injuries and the child's death was clear, the problem of proving
causation-a serious one in view of the undeveloped state of antenatal pedia-
trics-did not directly confront the court, and, in denying relief, it did not
mention this difficulty or the danger of fictitious claims. Only in subse-
quent cases where the child survived the prenatal injuries but was maimed
or deformed did the courts have to face the problem of proof. In the first
case of this type, Walker v. Great No. Ry. of Ire.,2 6 the complaint alleged
that the child, "quick in the womb" of his mother, was injured while the
mother was a passenger on defendant's train and was born crippled as a
1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953). Of course, inasmuch as a child born dead has no cause
of action, Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953); West v. McCoy, 233 S.C.
369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958), it is obvious that courts allowing recoveries to the estates
of nonsurviving fetuses, see note 18 supra, are not applying a strictly derivative
approach. Compare Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955). See generally
Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death, 15 RuTGEms
L. REV. 61 (1960).
23 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
24 Kanz v. Ryan, 51 Iowa 232, 1 N.W. 485 (1879), was an earlier death action.
There the court, without dealing with the considerations discussed in Dietrich, held
that a father could not recover for injuries suffered by a fetus who died as a
result of a miscarriage.25 Where Mr. Justice Holmes found a lack of precedent, others have claimed to
find persuasive analogies which cast doubt on his reasoning. Often cited in this
debate is a dictum in Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117
(Ch. 1798). To a contention that a child en ventre sa mere was a nonentity,
Buller, J., said: "Let us see what this non-entity can do. He may be vouched in
recovery, though it is for the purpose of making him answer over in value. He may
be an executor. He may take under the Statute of Distributions . . . . He may
take by devise. He may be entitled under a charge for raising portions. He may
have an injunction; and he may have a guardian." Id. at 332, 31 Eng. Rep. at 163.
2628 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891).
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result. In denying relief, the court emphasized that there was no con-
tractual relationship between the railroad and the plaintiff, and therefore
no independent duty owed to the plaintiff.2 7  The great influence of the
case, however, lay in Mr. Justice O'Brien's concurring opinion:
[T]here are instances in the law where rules of right are founded
upon the inherent and inevitable difficulty or impossibility of proof.
And it is easy to see on what a boundless sea of speculation in
evidence this new idea [to allow an action for prenatal injuries]
would launch us. What a field would be opened to extravagance
of testimony, already great enough-if Science could carry her
lamp . . . into the unseen laboratory of nature-could profess
to reveal the causes and things that are hidden there-could trace
a hair-lip to nervous shock, or a bunch of grapes on the face to
the fright--could, in fact, make lusus naturae the same thing as
lusus scientae. There may be a question of evidence . .
[plaintiff's attorney] modestly put it; but the law may see such
danger in that evidence, may have such a suspicion of human
ignorance and presumption, that it will not allow any question of
evidence to be entered into at all.2 8
This opinion had enormous influence; courts began to emphasize the
problem of proof as a reason for denying relief even in those death actions
where the problem of establishing a causal connection-as in Dietrich-
was minimal. A prime example is Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Jordan,29 where a woman gave premature birth to twins, allegedly as a
result of an auto accident caused by defendant's negligence. One of the
twins was born bruised and died nineteen days after delivery. The court,
in denying a death action to the child's estate, quoted Mr. Justice O'Brien
with approval, emphasizing the difficulty of proof and the consequent danger
of fictitious claims. The need to protect the courts from such difficulties
and abuses was said to justify denial of relief even in cases presenting
apparently meritorious claims.2 0
Most courts, however, set forth a number of reasons for denying relief
without giving disproportionate emphasis to the proof problem. Dietrich's
"lack of precedent" 31 and "no duty" 32 arguments were joined by justifica-
tions resting upon legislative responsibility 33 and the demands of stare
27Id. at 79. This reasoning has been aptly termed "conceptualistic jurisprudence
with a vengeance." 19 NACCA L.J. 232 (1957).
28 28 L.R. Ir. at 81-82 (O'Brien, J., concurring). See note 134 infra and accom-
panying text.
29 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W2d 944 (1935).
SOAccord, Stanford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926);
Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950).31 E.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Buel v.
United Ry., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913) (death action).
32 E.g., Allaire v. St. Luke s Hosp., supra note 31; Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry.
& Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
3 3 E.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638. (1900) ; Stemmer v.
Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
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decisis.3 4 It is likely, however, that the proof problem played a larger
part in influencing decisions than these courts were willing to acknowledge
in their opinions,3 5 for none of the other reasons are very persuasive. The
fact that the common law provided remedies in analogous areas weakens the
argument for legislative responsibility; 3 6 many of the reasons for stare
decisis are inapplicable in tort law; 37 and the "no duty" argument does
no more than to assume its conclusion.38 One of the criticisms often
leveled at the common-law judicial process is the reluctance of courts to
articulate their holdings expressly in terms of public policy.39 This re-
luctance seems to have been particularly marked in the prenatal injury
cases: being novel, most of these suits came up for review on demurrer;
to decide a cause on an evidential question-one that might not turn out
to be crucial in the case at hand-is to violate what some courts have
thought to be a fundamental canon of tort law to the effect that difficulty
of proof does not bar a substantive right.40 Modern courts, in overruling
the early decisions relying on Mr. Justice O'Brien's opinion, have impliedly
criticized their older brethren for violating this canon.4 1 However, insofar
as they support their own decisions by pointing to the advancement of
medical science, they are in fact condoning the earlier practice.
The abrupt shift in judicial attitudes was first signalled in 1946 by
Bonbrest v. Kotz,42 a malpractice suit brought against a physician for
negligently injuring the infant during the course of delivery. Causal con-
34 E.g., Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921) ; Gorman v. Bud-
long, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901).
35 One court went so far as to say the only reason for the old rule was the diffi-
culty of proof. Stemmer v. Kline, 19 N.J. Misc. 15, 17 A._d 58 (Cir. Ct 1940),
rev'd, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942) ; see 2 HA11PER & JAMEs,
TORTS § 18.3, at 1028-29 (1956); MoR~is, TORTS 198 (1953). Compare the develop-
ment of a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional disturbance, notes
127-28 infra and accompanying text.
3 6 See note 25 supra.
87 SEAVEY, COGITATiONS ON TORTS 65-69 (1954).
38 The development of the viability rule, however, suggests that the duty question
was important to the courts in framing their decisions. See note 52 infra and accom-
panying text.
39 See Patterson, Pound's Theory of Social Interests, in INTMPRETATioxS OF
MoDERN LEGAL PHrosoPHmxs 568-69 (Sayre ed. 1947).
40 See note 47 infra. Professor Morris suggests that the courts "seem to have
mistaken extent-of-liability problems for cause-in-fact problems." MoRRs, TORTS
201-02 (1953).
41 See Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.Zd 901, 906 (Ky. 1955) (death action);
Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1231, 258 S.W.2d 577, 580 (1953) (death action);
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 356, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951).
42 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). There had been a few uninfluential decisions
earlier. See Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (Dist. Ct. App.
1939) (decision based on statute); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct App.
1923) (civil-law death action) (inexplicably the decision was not released for publi-
cation until 1949); Montreal Tramways Co. v. Leveille, [1933] Can. Sup. Ct. 456,
465, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337, 346 (1933). The famous dissent of Mr. Justice Boggs
in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900), although
often quoted, was not followed by the early courts. See, e.g., Magnolia Coca Cola
Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 354, 78 S.W.2d 944, 946-47 (1935); Lipps v.
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 274-75, 159 N.W. 916, 917 (1916).
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nection being clear, the court did not discuss that problem as such; but
to the argument that there was a danger of fictitious claims in these cases,
it replied: "the law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical
science certainly has made progress since 1884 [when Dietrich was
decided] ." 43
Bonbrest has proved to be a landmark. Its role as the rallying point
for the new view is comparable only to that played by the O'Brien con-
currence for the old. The Bonbrest point of view has even come to
dominate cases in which causal connection is more difficult to establish.44
The overthrow of the Dietrich-Walker view, law for sixty years, has
proceeded rapidly in the past fifteen.45 Although there have been dis-
senters, 46 they have been too few to slow the forward impetus of the post-
Bonbrest movement.
The new approach was predicated on various justifications. Some
courts stated that difficulty of proof should not affect substantive rights.
47
Others emphasized that proof is no more difficult in prenatal injury cases
than in other personal injury cases,48 and that the rules of evidence can
handle any danger of fictitious claims.4 9 Finally, coupled with all of these
43 65 F. Supp. at 143.
44 See, e.g., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951) (child
born blind); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955) (child developed
cerebral palsy); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (child born a
Mongoloid).
4 5 See cases cited note 15 .mpra.
46 It has been said that medical knowledge of the cause of prenatal injuries has
not expanded, Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 441, 79 A2d 550, 562 (1951)
(concurring opinion); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 276-77, 164 A2d 93, 97-98
(1960) (dissenting opinion, on the specific question of Mongolism), and that even
if it has, it does not warrant the creation of a new cause of action, Drabbels v.
Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 23, 50 N.W.2d 229, 232 (1951) (death action); Hogan
v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 243, 319 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1958). The former state-
inents are patently erroneous and the latter beg the question if, in fact, lack of medical
knowledge was responsible for denial of relief in the past
4 7 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Ky. 1955) (death action);
Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1231, 258 S.W.2d 577, 580 (1953) (death action);
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 356, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951). In one pre-
Bonbrest case, Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 637, 92 P2d 678, 682 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1939), the court went so far as to say that if proof is more difficut in pre-
natal injury cases, courts should make it easier to sustain a claim, not harder. It is
unclear what the court had in mind. Procedural devices, such as presumptions,
designed to make it easier or harder to prove certain facts, are justified by considera-
tions beyond mere difficulty of proof: thus, res ipsa loquitur usually applies in cases
in which proof of negligence or care is more accessible to the defendant, see Ybarra v.
Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 155 P.2d 687 (1944) ; Wilson v. East St. Louis & Interurban
Water Co., 295 Ill. App. 603, 15 N.E.2d 599 (1938); the presumption against suicide
is grounded upon a strong factual probability, see Consumers Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 364 Ill. 145, 4 N.E.2d 34 (1936) ; and the presumption against illegitimacy
is a reflection of an overriding social policy to protect innocent children from being
branded as bastards, see Matter of Mathews, 153 N.Y. 443, 47 N.E. 901 (1897).
See generally McCoRmicic, EvnEixcF § 309, at 641 (1954). None of these justifica-
tions is applicable to the problem of proof in prenatal injury cases.
48 See, e.g., Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 486, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958);
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 365, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
49 See, e.g., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 437, 79 A2d 550, 559 (1951) ;
Montreal Tramways Co. v. Leveille, [1933] Can. Sup. Ct. 456, 465, [1933] 4 D.L.R.
337, 346 (1933). The court's reliance in the latter case on the rules of evidence seems
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explanations were broad statements implying that great advancements in
medicine now justified allowing recovery.50
B. Extension of a Cause of Action to Immature Fetuses:
The Viability Rule
When recovery was beginning to be allowed in prenatal injury cases,
it was limited to infants who were viable when injured.51 This limitation
was essentially based on the principle originally set forth in Dietrich that no
duty of care is owed to an unborn child.52 Perhaps it reflected a conceptual
difficulty in articulating how an independent duty can be owed to one who,
as a matter of medical fact, is incapable of independent existence. But
even if the new courts thought that they were preserving intact the old "no
duty" rule by saying that medicine had only recently discovered that a fetus
beyond a certain stage of development is capable of independent existence,
53
nevertheless, it is inescapable that they were significantly impairing that
rule as it was originally laid down, for medicine has long recognized the
fact of viability,54 and even the courts that originally enunciated the no-duty
rule in prenatal injury cases must have been aware of it from miscarriage
cases in which premature fetuses had survived.55 The earlier courts simply
refused to draw any distinction based on viability.56 Such a distinction,
allowing recovery only to viable fetuses, seems defensible, if at all, only
in death actions, where it could be reasoned that the meaning of the word
"person" in the statutes does not include nonviable fetuses.57 Yet it is
clearly unfounded. A theory of causation of club feet in the child was held sufficient
in that case despite the fact that there was no medical support for such a view.
Compare Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 353-54, 99 N.W.2d 163,
169 (1959).
50 See, e.g., Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 370, 38 N.W.2d 838, 841 (1949)
(death action) (quoting Bonbrest); Williams v. Marion Rapid Trans., Inc., 152
Ohio St 114, 125-26, 87 N.E2d 334, 339 (1949). Compare the recent statement of
two prominent medical scientists that professional optimism concerning a rapid de-
velopment of knowledge in this area has proved to be naive and premature. Warkany
& Kalter, supra note 1, at 1048-49.
51 In all of the early cases following Brnbrest, the operative facts or the court's
opinion limited recovery to viable fetuses. The first case to reject this rule was
Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953). Other cases are
cited note 65 infra.
52 Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921) ; see Dietrich v. North-
ampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Buel v. United Ry., 248 Mo. 126, 154 N.W. 71
(1913); CURRAN, LAW AND MFDICINE 117 (1960).
53 See Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
54 See PAT TN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 59-138 (2d ed. 1953).
55 Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15 (1884); see note 147 infra and
accompanying text. Of course, before the advent of cases allowing direct recovery
by the child for prenatal injuries, the condition of the child was relevant only insofar
as it added to the mother's own physical damage and mental suffering. See note
61 infra and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), in which
the court held, over a famous dissent by Mr. Justice Boggs, that the question of
independent existence was irrelevant, and that an action for prenatal injuries would
not lie regardless of the capabilities of the fetus at the time of the accident.
57 Similar logic has been used in death actions to deny recovery to the estates
of fetuses who did not survive birth. See note 18 supra. As that result loses adherents,
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doubtful that the 19th century legislatures that first passed the death
statutes in this country envisioned either nonviable or viable fetuses as
being within their terms; if relief is to be granted for prenatal or neonatal
death at all, it should extend to both types of cases.
What seems to have been misinformation about the facts of medical
science buttressed the viability distinction by providing not only convenient
authority for rejecting the old blanket rule against recovery while retaining
the "no duty" rule as to nonviable fetuses, but also support for the position
that the greater difficulty of proof in cases of nonviability should bar
recovery.58 This position is as erroneous as the duty distinction is
illogical.59 The difficulty of proving causation bears no relationship to
the viability or nonviability of the fetus at the time of the accident; rather,
the magnitude of the proof problem varies according to the particular facts
of each case. Indeed-and this is a fact of utmost importance-there is
substantial medical authority which indicates that congenital structural
defects occasioned by environmental factors can be sustained only within
the earliest stages of the prevable period.60 Judicial disallowance of actions
for injuries to nonviable fetuses may well be a denial of the most meritorious
claims.
The limitation of recovery to viable fetuses could be rationalized by
an argument which once was given as a reason for denying all recovery
for prenatal injuries, namely, that an injury to the child which is not too
speculative can be an element of damages in an action by the mother.6'
By this reasoning, in the context of the present discussion, any injury
sustained by the fetus during the previable period could be a part of the
mother's cause of action. In practice, however, modem courts have not
the viability distinction will take on independent significance; since a nonviable child
cannot survive birth, it is only when the survival requirement is discarded that the
question of recovery for the estate of a nonviable fetus presents an issue involving
only the viability rule.
58 See Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916
(1916); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 505, 93 S.E.2d 727,
728 (1956) (concurring opinion). One court noted the problem but stated that it
did not justify a categorical denial of relief for children injured while nonviable.
Smith v. Brennan, 31 NJ. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960). Of course, insofar as the
courts, in allowing recovery to viable fetuses, are willing to accept theories of
causation that are without adequate medical foundation, the incidence of such in-
justices will be increased by allowing similar recovery to nonviable fetuses. See
8 SmRAcusE L. REv. 115, 117 (1956).
59 See Comment, 26 FORDHAm L. Rv. 684, 687-88 (1958). Proof of conception
has worried some judges. See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga.
504, 507, 93 S.E.2d 727, 730 (1956) (dissenting opinion). But this is not much of a
problem, assuming immediate steps are taken to examine the mother. See GRAY,
Arrouimrs' TExTBooic oF MEmlciNE 710 (2d ed. 1940).
'O See notes 88-90 infra and accompanying text; cf. PoTTR & ADAm, FETAL AND
NEONATAL DEATH 65 (2d ed. 1949).
61 See Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884) (dictum); Buel v.
United Ry., 248 Mo. 126, 132, 154 S.W. 71, 72 (1913) (dictum). But the mother
had never been permitted to recover for injuries to the child. See Finer v. Nichols,
158 Mo. App. 539, 138 S.W. 889 (1911); Butler v. Manhattan Ry., 143 N.Y. 417,
38 N.E. 454 (1894).
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followed-at least not expressly-their own dicta; the mother's damages
are limited to her personal injuries.62
The injustice of excluding actions by nonviable fetuses becomes mani-
fest when it is realized that the results of the negligent actor's conduct are
precisely the same whether the fetus was viable or not. Perhaps this
consideration alone would have eventually induced most courts to drop
the viability rule. But that development has been hastened by increasing
awareness that the concept of viability is highly relative, depending for its
application on a multitude of different facts in different situations.6
3
Thus, it is not only unjust but unworkable.64  Expanded knowledge and
improved care have lengthened the period during which the fetus can
survive separated from the mother, but proof of the fact of viability is no
easier now than it was in the past.
Responding to these pressures, courts in six states have expressly
abandoned the viability rule in favor of a biological approach which em-
phasizes the separate nature of the child from the moment of conception. 5
There is little doubt that this trend will continue, and that the law will
someday make no distinction as to injuries sustained in the previable stage
as a basis for a cause of action for prenatal injuries. 66
62 See Berg v. New York Soc'y, 136 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Sup. Ct. 1954), ree/d on
other grounds, 286 App. Div. 783, 146 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1955). The mother's action
for a negligently caused miscarriage does not include recovery for loss of the unborn
fetus. Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P.2d 114 (1942); Malone v. Monongahela
Valley Traction Co., 104 W. Va. 417, 140 S.E. 340 (1927). But see Snow v. Allen,
227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933) (dictum) (malpractice); 1 BELLI, MODza Tamr.s
§43 (Supp. 1958), where the author states that the courts are in reality allowing
recovery to mothers for the injuries to their children by permitting large damage
awards. See Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 99, 268 P.2d 178, 180-81 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1954): "Considering the highly speculative nature of the pecuniary value of
an unborn child . . . it is apparent that practically everything that could be recovered
in an action for the death of an unborn child can now be recovered by the mother in
connection with her own claim for general damages."
63 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
64 Compare Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (recovery
allowed without regard to viability), with Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,
124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935) (recovery denied without regard to viability).
One court avoided the troublesome burden of proving viability, which is inherently
a question for medical testimony, by applying a "quick in the womb" rule instead.
An infant becomes "quick" when the mother begins to feel fetal movements; this
occurs one to two months before viability is achieved. Quickness will be a question
of fact to be decided by the jury, and this, of course, will depend on their conclusion
as to the mother's veracity. See Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100
(1955). This distinction has had no importance since Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe
Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
65 Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., supra note 64; Daley v. Meier,
178 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d
108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan supra note 64; Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542,
125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); see
Comment supra note 59. See also Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d
343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959) (dictum). This concept is not new to medicine but only
to the courts. See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text for a similar judicial
procedure, at an earlier stage in the development of the law of prenatal injuries, of
using long-established medical facts to achieve a desired result.
66 The question under death statutes is more difficult. Although a federal district
court in construing Pennsylvania law has recently held that a cause of action exists
for the death of a fetus killed before it became viable, Gullborg v. Rizzo, 145 THE
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II. ScoPE or LIABILITY
A. General Medical Considerations
In a prenatal injury case, as in any personal injury action, the plaintiff
is required to trace the chain of causation between his injury and the
defendant's alleged misconduct. Recent medical advances implicate en-
vironmental factors operating in the prenatal period as, to some degree,
causative of various disorders in newborn children. Among these dis-
orders are cerebral palsy,6 7 epilepsy,68 mental deficiency, 69 reading dis-
abilities,70 behavioral disorders,7 1 tics,72 mongolism,73 microcephalus, 74
LEGAL INTLLIGENcER (Philadelphia) 769 (1961), no court has yet upheld a verdict
awarding damages for the death of a nonviable fetus. At least if the death statute is
punitive in nature, see note 18 supra, recovery should be allowed. But courts that
find statutory use of the word "person" to be crucial, see Mitchell v. Couch, 285
S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955), may refuse to extend the meaning of the word to include
nonviable fetuses. See Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d
912 (1960). Compare text following note 57 m.pra. However, the justification used
in the prenatal injury cases would seem equally applicable here, no matter what type
of death statute is involved. It is just as illogical to permit recovery for the estates of
viable fetuses and to deny it to those of nonviable fetuses; the loss to the parents is
the same. See note 18 supra.
67 SeDENHOFF & ROBINAULT, CEREBRAL PALSY AND RELATED DISORDERS 9-15
(1960); Evans, Antecedents of Infantile Cerebral Palsy, 23 ARcH. Dis. CHLD. 213
(1948); Lilienfeld & Parkhurst, A Study of the Association of Factors of Pregnancy
and Parturition with the Development of Cerebral Palsy, 53 AMR. J. HYG. 262
(1951) ; Lilienfeld & Pasamanick, The Association of Maternal and Fetal Factors
With the Development of Cerebral Palsy and Epilepsy, 70 AiER. J. OBSTET. & GYN-c.
93 (1955); Perlstein, Medical Aspects of Cerebral Palsy, 8 NnRvous CHILD. 128
(1949).
68 See BRIDGE, EPILEPSY AND CoNvuLsIvE DISORDERS n CHILDREN 31 (1949);
Lilienfeld & Pasamanick, Association of Maternal and Fetal Factors with the Develop-
ment of Epilepsy, I. Abnormalities in the Prenatal and Paranatal Periods, 155 A.M.
AJ. 719 (1954); Lilienfeld & Pasamanick, Maternal and Fetal Factors in the De-
velopment of Epilepsy, I. Relationship to Some Clinical Features of Epilepsy, 5
N uRoLoGY 77, 80, 83 (1955).
69 See Lilienfeld & Pasamanick, Association of Maternal and Fetal Factors with
the Development of Mental Deficiency, I. Abnormalities in the Prenatal and Paranatal
Periods, 159 A.M.A.J. 155 (1955); Lilienfeld & Pasananick, The Association of
Maternal and Fetal Factors with Development of Mental Deficiency, II. Relationship
to Maternal Age, Birth Order, Previous Reproductive Loss and Degree of Mental
Deficiency, 60 ALR. 3. MENT. DEFIc. 557 (1956).
70 See Kawi & Pasamanick, Association of Factors of Pregnancy with the De-
velopment of Reading Disorders in. Childhood, 166 A.M.A.J. 1420 (1958).
71 See Pasamanick, Knobloch & Lilienfeld, Socioeconomic Status and Some
Precursors of Neuropsychiatric Disorder in Children, 26 AmF.m J. ORTHoPsYcrAT.
594 (1956).
72 Pasamanick & Kawi, A Study of the Association. of Prenatal and Paranatal
Factors with the Development of Tics in Children, 48 J. PEDIAT. 596 (1956).
73 See BENDA, THE CHIL WITH MONGOLISM 194-227 (1960); LEVINSON &
BIGLER, MENTAL RETARDATION IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN 215 (1960); NELSON,
PEDIATRIcs 1132 (7th ed. 1959); Ingalls & Gordon, Epidemiologic Implicatims of
Developmental Arrests, 214 AMER. J. MED. ScI. 322, 324-25 (1947) ; Ingalls, Etiology
of Mongolism, 74 AMER. J. Dis. CHILD. 147 (1947). It has recently been shown that
Mongolism is associated with the presence of an extra chromosome. The origin and
type of the additional chromosome, however, has not been identified. Jacobs, Baikde,
Court Brown & Strong, The Somatic Chromosomes in Mongolism, [1959] 1 LANcET
710. See also Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) ; Pahl v. Milwaukee
Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959) (insufficient proof to recover
for Mongolism), discussed in text accompanying notes 256-66 infra.
74 See DaLs, OBST cs 863 (12th ed. Greenhill 1960) ; MURPHY, CONGENITAL
MALFOmRATIONS 98-99 (2d ed. 1947).
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hydrocephalus, 75 cretinism, 76 erythroblastosis fetalis,7 7 and structural defects
such as cleft palate.78 Environmental agents also can play a role in
causing abortion, premature labor,79 and stillbirth and neonatal death.80
A plaintiff burdened with one of these conditions may be able to trace with
varying reliability-as to structural defects, for example, only five environ-
mental factors have been clearly identified as teratogenic 8I-a chain of
causation connecting his disorder with someone's act of negligence.
At present, however, medical understanding of environmental causa-
tion of congenital malformation and injury has not advanced beyond
a stage of generality. Many of the scientific theories which have been
advanced seem to be applicable to almost all medical problems of the new-
born. Warkany, in explaining the general mechanism, has stated that con-
75 See Yannet, Mental Deficiency Due to Prenatally Determined Factors, 5
PEDIATRICS 328, 333 (1950).
76 See MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 233-34 (1962) ; Yannet, supra note 75.
7 7 HOLT, DISEASES OF INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD 616-25 (11th ed. 1940) ; PICKLES,
HA0moLYTIC DISEASE OF THE NEWBORN 62-63 (1949); POTTER, PATHOLOGY OF THE
FETUS AND THE NEWBORN 544-48 (1952). See generally MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLU-
ENCES 251-68 (1962). In some cases, erythroblastosis fetalis may give rise to a mal-
practice suit. A transfusion of Rh positive blood into an Rh negative female will cause
antibodies to be formed which will react with the circulation of a subsequently con-
ceived Rh positive fetus and result in complications for both mother and fetus. See
Berg v. New York Soc'y, 136 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Sup. Ct 1954) (mother cannot recover
for negligent blood transfusion that caused death of child when she subsequently
conceived). This type of case is unique in that it presents a situation in which the
negligent conduct, the transfusion, occurred before the fetus was conceived. This
should not prevent the recovery of damages, however, if the usual prerequisites of
liability are established. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.3, at 1030 (1956).
78 Fraser, Walker & Trasler, Experimental Production of Congenital Cleft Palate:
Genetic and Environmental Factors, 19 PEDIATRICS 782 (1957) ; Strean & Peer, Stress
as an Etiologic Factor in the Development of Cleft Palate, 18 PLAS. RECONSTR. SURG.
1 (1956).
79 See JAvERT, SPONTANEOUS AND HABITUAL ABORTION 238-43 (1957); POTTER,
PATHOLOGY OF THE FETUS AND THE NEWBORN 48-51 (1952); TAussiG, ABORTION,
SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED 114-16 (1936); Diddle, Trauma and Interruption of
Pregnancy, 44 TEXAS J. MED. 520 (1948); McNeil, Accidental Injuries to Wonen,
83 CAL. MED. 30 (1955).
80 See MoRISON, FOETAL AND NEONATAL PATHOLOGY 98 (1952) ; POTTER & AAI,
FETAL AND NEONATAL DEATH (2d ed. 1949) ; Labate, A Study of the Causes of Fetal
and Neonatal Mortality on the Obstetric Service of Bellevue Hospital, 54 AMER. J.
OBsTET. & GYNEC. 188, 189, 195-98 (1947); Potter, Fetal and Neonatal Deaths, 115
A.M.A.J. 996 (1940). An infant who survives birth may still die in the neonatal
period due to a preexisting cause arising from a prenatal injury. Premature infants
are similarly burdened; in addition, they are more susceptible to neonatal infection than
full-term infants and many die of prematurity per se. See CROSSE, THE PREMATURE
BABY 134-36 (3d ed. 1952). See also notes 167-69 infra and accompanying text;
James, The Later Health of Premature Infants: A Field for Further Study, 22
PEDIARICS 154, 158 (1958).
81 They are radiation, rubella, the toxoplasma organism, acute folic acid defi-
ciency, and synthetic progestins; they explain less than 1% of congenital mal-
formations. Fraser, Causes of Congenital Malformation in Human Beings, 10 J.
CHRON. Dis. 97-98 (1959). None of them is specifically related to accident situations.
However, they often tend to indicate malpractice. Particularly significant in this
regard is folic acid deficiency which can result from an unsuccessful attempt to induce
abortion by means of aminopterin. Id. at 98. The physician's liability in such a
case for a resulting malformation can pose a difficult question. See notes 180-81
infra and accompanying text. The issues are not as complicated when an unjustifiable
attempt by the mother is involved. See notes 199-200 infra.
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genital malformations are the result of adverse borderline conditions 82
the theory of "borderline insult". If a certain environmental (or hereditary
or combination) factor is strong enough, it will push the fetal organism
below the threshold of life.83 Less powerful agents, while not fatal, may
cause congenital defects. Pasamanick, Lilienfeld, and their associates, in
a series of studies on the association of prenatal and paranatal8 4 environ-
mental factors with various neuropsychiatric disorders in children, found
a significant relationship between certain complications of pregnancy 8__
most of which interfered directly or indirectly with the fetal oxygen
supply K8 -and mental disease in the offspring. They hypothesized a con-
tinuum of reproductive casualty consisting of brain damage incurred during
the prenatal and paranatal periods as a result of complications of pregnancy
occurring during these periods and leading to a gradient of injury extending
from fetal and neonatal death, through cerebral palsy, to comparatively
minor behavioral disorders, and possibly tics. 87 Ingalls has emphasized
the developmental arrest theory,8 according to which environmentally
caused congenital defects are fetal manifestations of critical stress on the
mother during pregnancy. The severity of defects is determined by the
82Warkany, Etiology of Congenital Malformations, 2 ADVANCE PIAT. 1, 53
(1947).
8
3 This threshold is termed the "borderline of stress tolerance" in Stott, Some
Psychosomatic Aspects of Casualty in Reproduction, 3 J. PsYcHosoM. REs. 42 (1958).
84 "Paranata1" refers generally to factors associated with birth. Unlike "pre-
natal," it connotes no specific temporal relationship to the event of the birth.
85 Some of the more common complications involved in the studies were pre-
eclampsia, hypertensive disease, and bleeding during pregnancy.
86Anoxia has not been definitely correlated with congenital malformation.
Warkany & Kalter, Congenital Malformations, 265 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 1046, 1047
(1961).
87 Kawi & Pasamanick, Association of Factors of Pregnancy with the Develop-
ment of Reading Disorders in Childhood, 166 A.M.A.J. 1420 (1958); Lilienfeld &
Pasanianick, The Association of Maternal and Fetal Factors with the Development
of Cerebral Palsy and Epilepsy, 70 AmER. J. Os=r. & GYNxc. 93 (1955) ; Lilienfeld
& Pasamanick, Association of Maternal and Fetal Factors with the Development of
Mental Deficiency, I. Abnormalities in the Prenatal and Paranatal Periods, 159
A.M.A.J. 155, 157-60 (1955); Pasamanick & Kawi, A Study of the Association of
Prenatal and Paranatal Factors with the Development of Tics in Children, 48 J.
PEDrAT. 596, 600 (1956); Pasamanick, Knobloch & Lilienfeld, Socioeconomic Status
and Some Precursors of Neuropsychiatric Disorder in Children, 26 AMdER. J. ORTHO-
PsYcHIAT. 594, 597-600 (1956). No such relationship was found with childhood
speech disorders. Pasamanick, Constantinou & Lilienfeld, Pregnancy Experience and
the Development of Childhood Speech Disorders, 91 A.M.AJ. Dis. Cm=. 113 (1956).
See generally MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLuENcEs 379-91 (1962).
8 The theory is not original with Ingalls, see Stockard, Developmental Rate
and Structural Expressions: An Experimental Study of Twins, 'Double Monsters'
and Single Deformities and the Interaction Among Embryonic Organs During Their
Origin and Development, 28 AiER. J. ANAT. 115 (1920), but he has been its strongest
contemporary advocate, see Ingalls & Gordon, supra note 73; Ingalls, Causes and
Prevention of Developmental Defects, 161 A.M.A.J. 1047 (1956) ; Ingalls, Congenital
Deformities, Sci. Amer., Oct. 1957, p. 109. For an application of the theory to a
specific situation see Ingalls & Prindle, Esophageal Atresia with Tracheoesophageal
Fistula, 240 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 987 (1949). See Letter From F. Clarke Fraser,
M.D., Ph.D., in 162 A.M.AJ. 1651 (1956), for a criticism of the Ingalls hypothesis,
and Ingalls' reply, 163 A.M.A.J. 771 (1957).
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magnitude of the environmental agent; 8 9 the type of malformation produced
is related to the state of fetal development at the time of the adverse in-
fluence. The latter premise is based on the known facts that fetal develop-
ment occurs during the first trimester of life and follows an established
pattern, consisting of a series of critical stages; organs and structures
experience a period of rapid growth and cellular differentiation, during
which they are peculiarly susceptible to environmental influences. 0 The
possibility of nonhereditary structural defects is limited to this short period.
Other experts, however, have cautioned against excessive reliance on the
developmental arrest thesis-or indeed on any general theory 91 _-as it often
fails to explain satisfactorily the complex interrelationship between genetic
and environmental factors and is far from the only mechanism involved. 2
It is obvious that the various theories are not necessarily inconsistent:
indeed, their generality virtually precludes that possibility.
B. Legal Situations
Negligently 9 3 caused accidents are the most common source of pre-
natal injuries giving rise to a cause of action for damages. 4 In a practical
sense, the child's cause of action does not accrue until it dies before term--
when its estate may be able to recover-or is born maimed. In most cases
the infant's cause of action can be described as quasi-derivative, insofar
as the standard of care owed to a fetus is no greater than that owed to the
mother; if the mother does not have a cause of action-problems of proof
of causation aside-because the care exercised by the alleged tortfeasor was
as great as could reasonably have been expected of him, neither will the
child. However, there could be exceptions to this general rule. A third
party could be held liable to the infant and not to the mother. 5 Moreover,
the mother could be negligent either by herself or in conjunction with a third
party.9 6 As the law presently exists, liability is circumscribed only by
limits on' the plaintiff's ability to prove causation. This proof normally
involves two elements: establishing a maternal condition brought about
89 Of course, if the trauma or resulting congenital defect is severe enough, an
abortion will result. See notes 152-55 infra and accompanying text. If the fetus
survives the first trimester, the pregnancy will usually go to full term. See Portr
& ADAIR, FETAL AND NEoNATAL DEATH 65-66 (2d ed. 1949).
9 0 For a timetable of the various developments, see AREY, DEVELoPMENTAL Ax-
ATOMY 106 (6th ed. 1954).
91 Warkany & Kalter, supra note 86, at 1051.
92 PATTEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 230-32 (2d ed. 1953); Warkany & Kalter,
supra note 86, at 1050.
93 In this discussion the term "negligence" will be used in the factual sense of
failure to use due care, and not in the legal sense where its meaning also includes a
breach of duty to the plaintiff which proximately causes damage to the plaintiff. See
generally MCCORMICl, DAMAGES §22, at 88-89 (1935); PRossn, TORTs §35, at
165-66 (2d ed. 1955).
94 For a discussion of the effects which trauma may have upon the body, see
Generalized and "Stress" Effects of Injury, Current Med., Sept. 1955, p. 8.
95 See text accompanying notes 136-39 infra and note 172 infra.
96 See text accompanying notes 199-204 infra.
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by the defendant's act and proving that this condition caused the harmful
effects from which the child suffers. In some cases, both elements may be
equally difficult to prove, but usually the second element will be the central
problem. 7 The following subsections will examine the scope of liability,
with emphasis on the problems of proof involved, in various kinds of
prenatal injury situations which are likely to result in legal consequences.
C. Injuries for Which a Defendant May Be Liable
1. Accidental Injuries to the Fetus
a. Physical Injuries
If an accident occurs during the first trimester and the child is subse-
quently born with a structural defect caused by "too little growth," 2 8 it is
often medically possible to show a close relationship between the accident
and the resulting injury or to exclude the possibility of such a relationship.
Given a certain defect, the developmental arrest theory can determine the
approximate time of its origin.9 9 Although in most cases the biological
process actually producing the defects is not known,100 a case may be
legally sufficient under existing evidential rules if it can demonstrate a
general cause and effect relationship.
97 1nfectious diseases are the most common example of cases in which the first
element will be of particular difficulty. Infection may result from a maternal injury
-either directly through the wound or indirectly by increasing the mother's suscepti-
bility to external agents-and thereby adversely affect the fetus. See the excellent
table and bibliography of the effect of infectious diseases on the fetus in Desmond,
Franklin, Blattner & Hill, The Relation of Maternal Disease to Fetal and Neonatal
Morbidity and Mortality, 8 PEDIAT. CLN. N. AMER. 421, 423-24 (1961). See also
Potter, Placental Transmission of Viruses, 74 AMER. 3. OBST-. & GYNEC. 505 (1957).
Since comparatively much has been learned by the medical profession in this area,
the problem in many of these cases will be to relate the maternal disease to the accident.
Unfortunately, such a correlation is often speculative. See, e.g., the difficulties present
in the case of syphilis, Merritt & Solomon, Relation of Trauma to Syphilis of the
Nervous System, 117 ANN. SURG. 623, 631 (1943), a disease known to be a cause of
congenital deafness and mental retardation in the newborn, Warkany & Kalter, supra
note 86, at 1046. For the similar problems raised in the case of toxemia, see note
141 infra. See generally MoNTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENcES 224-50 (1962). For the
legal test that will be applied in these cases see text accompanying notes 205-23 infra.
98 Conceptually, congenital defects can also be caused by "too much growth," see
PA=N, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 230 (2d ed. 1953), but the developmental arrest theory
is presently more emphasized by the medical profession. Whereas a developmental
arrest is caused by a deficiency or inhibiting agent, the "too much growth" process
is caused by an accelerating factor. It would seem that as more becomes known about
the latter phenomenon, its general cause and effect relationship will be able to be
traced just as efficiently as the relationship shown by the developmental arrest theory.
99 See AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 106 (6th ed. 1954). Succinct examples
are given by Ingalls & Gordon, supra note 73, at 328: "Patency of the cardiac septum
cannot come into being as a developmental arrest after the septum has closed; nor
an imperforate anus after the anal membrane has perforated."
100As noted earlier, a structural defect can be caused by heredity alone, by
environment alone, or by a complex interrelationship between the two. Current
medical thought seems to be that most congenital defects are caused by heredity and
environment in combination. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. Of course,
the developmental arrest concept applies to both environmental causation and dual
etiology cases.
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Caution must be exercised, however, in relying on such a generalized
explanation, for even if the defendant's act occurred at a period of fetal
development during which the prenatal injuries in question could be ex-
pected to follow, that does not necessarily mean that his acts caused the
malformation. In theory, a hereditary factor predating conception or any
interference with embryogenesis before the crucial time could manifest itself
at the critical period; any causative agent present during the determination
period-the time preceding the critical stage of development for the struc-
ture in question--could have brought about the injury. If, however, the
defendant's acts took place after the critical period of development, a more
confident assertion can be made: it is unlikely that any conduct occurring
after the completion of a structural formation-the termination period-
would cause a structural defect.1 0' But even this assertion admits of excep-
tions. Most likely is some sort of resorptive process gone awry which could
cause a stage of development already completed to be "undone." 102 This
and other possibilities 103 emphasize the speculative nature of present medical
knowledge and throw doubt on what otherwise might be, medically and a
fortiori legally,1° 4 a simple cause and effect relationship.
Even more complex problems are involved if the accident occurred
after the first trimester. It is generally thought that the same structural
defects that can be produced during the critical developmental period of the
first three months cannot be caused by an accident occurring thereafter.105
However, the possibility of a process of resorption-triggered, in this con-
text, by a post-first-trimester accident-suggests possible exceptions. In
view of the present lack of knowledge as to the operation of the resorptive
process-or other similar mechanisms 0 6 -any attempt to connect a con-
genital structural defect to an accident occurring after the first three months
should be unavailing.
10 7
However, injury to the mother after the first trimester can affect the
child physically in another way: the infant can be born with a congenital
101 See Warkany & Kalter, supra note 86, at 1050.
1
0 2 See PATTEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 231 (2d ed. 1953); Patten, Varying De-
velop-mental Mechanisms in Teratology, 19 PDATRIcs 734, 746 (1957).
103 Among other problems is the fact that very few environmental agents
have been scientifically established to be teratogenic. See, e.g., note 81 supra and
accompanying text. And even these agents do not always cause malformations, so
their presence does not necessarily exclude the possibility that other factors may be
involved. See Fraser, supra note 81, at 98. Finally, a great number of malformations
can be caused by either environment or heredity, and it is difficult to distinguish the
specific etiology of many cases. Warkany & Kalter, supra note 86, at 1049-50.
104 Medical and legal concepts of causation are discussed in text accompanying
notes 205-12 infra.
105 See notes 90, 101 supra.
106 See PA=SEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 231 (2d ed. 1953).
107 On the basis of the fragmentary accounts of the evidence in the courts' opinions,
the decisions would appear to bear out this analysis. Whether the situation is the
result of chance or conscious adherence to a pattern must await future exposition.
The medically unsupportable nature of some of the awards granted in congenital de-
formities cases, see note 255 infra, suggests that a similar development may occur in
the structural defect cases.
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deformity, 0 8 such as a club foot. Whereas a structural defect implies some-
thing gone wrong with the developmental process itself, a congenital de-
formity comes about when the end product goes awry, the initial cause
usually being a mechanical factor.1" 9 Although a deformity is not a
structural anomaly in a developmental sense, it can be so considered if its
gross anatomical aspects are given paramount emphasis. 110 A deformity
can be caused at any time during the pregnancy cycle; it is therefore a
mistake to conclude that it is always unjust to award damages for con-
genital anomalies resulting from tortious conduct after the first trimester."'
In the normal case, however, any accident during the critical first three
months that would be serious enough to produce a deformity would very
likely result in a structural defect instead. Since there is presently no
known correlation between accidents occurring after the termination periods
for particular anatomical developments and any structural defects, the
first item of proof for the infant if the accident occurred during the last
two trimesters is to establish that the injury with which he is burdened is a
deformity rather than a structural defect. Although there is some overlap
between the two types of injuries, it is sometimes possible to draw a medical
distinction between them.112 The next step is to prove causation itself.
This task is complicated by the fact that any external trauma inflicted upon
the mother which has the ultimate effect of exerting prolonged pressure-
abnormal fetal position 113 or the twisting of the umbilical cord around
part of the fetus 114 are common illustrations-on some part of the fetal
organism could conceivably result in a deformity. But the law is not
necessarily concerned with the specific process involved; a case may be
108 Although the distinction between defects and deformities is seldom made in
medical circles, it should have legal significance.
109 Interview With Dr. Charles Lintgen, Clinical Professor of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, Jefferson Medical College, in Philadelphia, Oct. 20, 1961.
110 Subtle distinctions of this sort help to explain the difficulty in comprehending
medical terminology in this area. See generally Warkany & Kalter, supra note 86.
Note that these authors define gross structural defects to include prenatal deformities.
Id. at 1050; see note 1 supra.
111 Such a conclusion is implied in CURRAN, LAW AND MEDICINE 117-18 (1960).
But cf. POTTR & ADAIR, FETA. AND NEONATAL DEATHa 65 (2d ed. 1949).
112 Interview With Dr. Charles Lintgen, Clinical Professor of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, Jefferson Medical College, in Philadelphia, Oct. 20, 1961. Compare
Warkany & Kalter, sipra note 86, at 1050.
113 For purposes of the law of prenatal injuries, ascribing cause to this factor,
although it is likely to be attempted, should prove unavailing. The fetus does not
assume a fixed position until the presenting part has engaged in the pelvis, shortly
before term. See DELE, OBsTETics 220-21 (12th ed. Greenhill 1960). Therefore,
trauma inflicted upon the mother earlier in the pregnancy does not usually affect
fetal position. Moreover, an injury in the final weeks severe enough to cause a shift
of the fetus in the mother's womb usually terminates in premature labor. Thus,
although abnormal fetal position may cause deformity, it will ordinarily be the result
of some preexisting physiological process, not of a traumatic accident.
114 A case built on the theory that trauma inflicted upon the mother caused a
congenital deformity in the child by means of abnormal pressure exerted by the um-
bilical cord would run into proof difficulties. Diagnostic irradiation of the maternal
pelvis may be dangerous to the fetus. See note 172 infra. Moreover, since the cord
does not cast a shadow, it will not show up on the x-ray plate. The legal significance
of this fact is that, although a deformity might be revealed, there is no reliable way of
establishing before delivery either that the position of the cord was normal before
the accident or that it was abnormal afterwards.
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sufficient under existing evidential rules if medical testimony establishes a
general cause and effect relationship. Given a known deformity, the stage
of pregnancy when the accident occurred, and the severity of the stress " -
all questions of fact-, an expert medical witness may be able to state-
usually in terms of very general possibilities-that such a deformity did or
did not occur as a result of the accident.11 6 However, if the trauma was
very severe, the veracity of the medical witness or the mother may be open
to question, since such an accident is more likely to result in miscarriage
than to cause a deformity.117 Moreover, the anatomical similarity of many
congenital deformities to gross structural defects, and the difficulty of as-
certaining the specific mechanisms which operated to produce any given
deformity are epitomized by the very general nature of the medical testi-
mony which must be given in a case of this sort. They suggest that extreme
caution must attend any extension of relief to an infant who alleges that his
injuries resulted from an accident occurring after the first trimester, despite
a possible theoretical merit in the claim.""
b. Mental Injuries
To the extent that a mental illness may be the result of developmental
arrests in the central nervous system, the preceding discussion of structural
defects is relevant. Aside from direct physical damage, however, the
central nervous system can be severely and permanently damaged in other
ways. Unfortunately, even less is known of the specific mechanisms here
than in the area of physical injuries. However, the same basic factors of
heredity, environment, and their interaction are known to be operative.
More specifically, it is known that trauma inflicted upon the mother can
interfere with transmission of oxygen to the fetal brain, which, like the
mature brain, is particularly susceptible to oxygen deficiency." 9 This may
be the result when the trauma produces external hemorrhage, placental de-
tachment, uterine bleeding, or a state of shock in the mother, whether or
115 The severity of a deformity would seem to be related to the strength of the
stress and the stage of pregnancy when it was applied. Interview With Dr. Charles
Lintgen, Clinical Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Jefferson Medical College,
in Philadelphia, Oct. 20, 1961.
116 Compare note 214 infra.
117 See PATN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 230 (2d ed. 1953) ; Gruenwald, Mechanimns
of Abnormal Development, 44 ARcH. PATH. 398, 415 (1947).
118 Because of the proof difficulties previously raised, see notes 113-14 sutpra, in
many of the cases involving deformities, there would seem to be insufficient medical
support for allowing recovery even on the basis of the allegations. See Hornbuckle
v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E2d 727 (1956) (action for damages
for deformed right foot, ankle, and leg); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d
497 (1960) (deformities to legs and feet); Von Elbe v. Studebaker-Packard Corp.,
15 D. & C.2d 635 (C.P. 1958) (clubfoot); Montreal Tramways Co. v. Idveill6,
[1933] Can. Sup. Ct. 456, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933) (same), see note 49 mipra.
119 See Cole, Kimball & Daniels, Etiologic Factors in Neonatal Asphyxia, 113
A.M.A.J. 2038-39 (1939); Eastman, Mount Everest in Utero, 67 AMER. J. OasTxE.
& GYNEc. 701, 705-11 (1954). See also note 87 supra and accompanying text. The
fetus is remarkably resistant to oxygen deficiencies that would kill an adult, but even
with it there is a level below which deprivation will damage the nervous system.
MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENcEs 370 (1962).
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not accompanied by physical injury.
20 The continuum of reproductive
casualty '2 which seems to be related to oxygen deficiency has tremendous
legal implications.122 Almost any serious accident in which a pregnant
woman is injured could result in one of the physical reactions 
just listed.'2 3
But medical science, which has discovered a great deal about congenital
defects and deformities in a remarkably short time, has not yet found any
correlations between various levels of oxygen deficiency at particular times
during pregnancy and specific kinds and degrees of mental harm.
2 4 For
this reason, the difficulty of excluding prior, intervening, and superseding
causes is even greater when the defect in question is mental than when it
is anatomical. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a
possible relationship between certain environmental factors and congenital
mental defects. Whether recovery should be allowed is problematical.
Even if a court would consider the burden of proof as to cause-in-fact satis-
fied by the very general expert testimony which present medical knowledge
can afford, 2 5 there still remain questions of public policy which can be
lumped together under the heading of proximate cause.12
6
2. Maternal Emotional Disturbance in the Sequence of Causation
Recovery for negligently inflicted emotional disturbance alone used to
be denied for most of the reasons that were offered in support of the old
prenatal injury rule-mainly difficulties of proof and the consequent danger
of fictitious claims.' 2 7 Today, the cause of action is allowed, with only a
few limitations.-28
120 The fetus may be harmed if the shock sufficiently slows the rate of blood flow
in the maternal circulation. See Beal, Traumatic Shock, in SURGICAL TiREATMMX
OF TRAuiEA 26 (Wade ed. 1960).
12 1 See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
122 But hemorrhage in itself does not automatically imply an oxygen deficiency.
See note 265 infra.
I Interview With Dr. Charles Lintgen, Clinical Professor of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, Jefferson Medical College, in Philadelphia, Oct. 20, 1961.
124 MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 379-80 (1962).
125 See note 214 infra and accompanying text.
126 See Morris, On the Teaching of Legal Cause, 39 CoLum. L. REv. 1087 (1939).
127 See HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 18.4, at 1032-33 (1956) ; PROSSa, TORTS § 37,
at 176-77 (2d ed. 1955); Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. REv. 725, 733
(1937).
1
2
8 The more liberal courts in emotional disturbance cases have not only abolished
the impact rule, see note 131 infra, but have allowed recovery for injuries based on
purely subjective symptoms. See Klein v. Medical Bldg. Co., 147 So. 122 (La. Ct.
App. 1933) (traumatic hysteria, caused by fright). Today, only ~ minority retain
the traditional judicial scepticism toward SUCh symptoms. See Norton v. United
States, 110 F. Supp. 94 (N.D . .1953) (no recovery for traumatic neurosis). Ithas been stated that many of the recoveries all w d in neurosis cases are unjustifiable
because there is no adequate proof of a causal relation. See H. Smith, Relaton of
Em ot o n¢ to Iury 
a n D isease: Legal 
Li bility for Psych 
c Stim uli, 30 VA. L. 
R.
193, 283-84 (1944). See generally H. Smit & Solomon, Tra,tic 
Neurosi)s I
Court, 30 VA. L. Ir. 87 (1943). In Note, Tlort Lailiy for Micrrige 
"aued
by Fright, 15 U. CeL L .L188 (1947), the author 
concludes that ourts are now
allowing recovery for 
amscarriges caused by fightt because of "icreased medical
knowledge"' when in fact the new knowledge only indcates that a miscarriage 
can not
be caused by fright A similar pattern seems to be dev loping 
in the p enatal i jury
field. See CURAN, LAw AND MEICIN 117-18 (1960).
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Pregnant women are highly susceptible to emotional distress, 129 but
to allow recovery to a fetus injured indirectly by such an occurrence would
be a dramatic departure. It would bring together two areas of tort law
in which courts have long been deeply concerned about the possibility of
fabrications. 130 It would also combine two areas in which technicalities
have abounded. Thus, some of the courts which allow recovery for emo-
tional disturbance continue to require impact '3 1-- although the requirement
can often be met by the most trivial touch.13 There is some danger that
the technicalities may be allowed to obscure the difficult underlying prob-
lems of policy.las However, the question of whether a fetus damaged by
its mother's emotional distress can satisfy the impact rule by showing
impact upon the mother seems to be such a legalistic parody that courts
will be forced to deal openly with the crucial problem which infects this
area-whether there is so much danger of fictitious claims in such a case 1
34
that it is necessary to deny relief in all cases in which an emotional dis-
turbance to the mother is a necessary causative link between the defendant's
negligence and the injury to the fetus.
Another problem arising from such an extension of relief is that while
the mother's cause of action may be barred by the statute of limitations,
in most states the statute will not begin to run on the infant until he reaches
majority.135 It seems obvious that if the prenatal injury rule is to be ex-
tended, equity demands that no right of action be allowed unless the de-
fendant receives timely notice after the birth of the plaintiff, since in these
cases especially he may not even know that he has engaged in tortious
conduct.
129 See Stott, Some Psychosomatic Aspects of Casualty in Reproduction, 3 J.
PsYcrosom. REs. 42, 47 (1958).
130 See PROSSER, TORTS §37, at 178 (2d ed. 1955).
131 See Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958) ; Fright, Shock and
Emotional Distress § 1.02, in 4 PERSONAL INJURY 249 (Frumer, Benoit & Freedman ed.
1956).
132 E.g., Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102, 92 N.E. 1010 (1910). "The magic
formula 'impact' is pronounced; the door opens to the full joy of a complete recovery."
Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MicH. L. R v. 497, 504 (1922).
1 3 See PRoSsER, TORTS § 37, at 178 (2d ed. 1955).
134 There are probably stronger motivations for unfounded claims in this area
than in most other cases of emotional disturbance. It is only natural for a mother
distraught by the birth of a maimed child-a torment aggravated by her daily contact
with the infant-to seize upon some event during pregnancy to explain her tragedy.
Now discredited old wives' tales exemplify this type of reasoning. See AREY, DE-
VELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 185-86 (6th ed. 1954); PATTEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 228
(2d ed. 1953); Warkany, Congenital Malformation in the Past, 10 J. CHRON. Dis.
84, 87-90 (1959). But see MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFUENCES 8 (1962). The possibility
of giving legal effect to such myths was evidently what disturbed Mr. Justice O'Brien
in his concurring opinion in the Walker case. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
See also Young v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929)
(recovery for birthmarks).
135 See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 5535 (1958), Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. v. Scarborough, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 194, 68 S.W. 196 (1902). Compare PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 34-35 (1953), Von Colin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 367 Pa. 232, 80 A2d
83 (1951).
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Finally, there may be cases in which the defendant should not be held
liable at all, even though cause-in-fact can be proved and the possibility of
a fictitious claim eliminated. It'is not unlikely that medicine will someday
discover that a fetus can be harmed by maternal emotional disturbance
which is too slight to give rise to a cause of action for damages on the part
of the mother.136 Although the defendant's conduct may be very culpable,
even though the mother herself is not actually injured by it, the mother,
of course, cannot recover for an emotional disturbance which might
have been inflicted on her, since relief in negligence actions is based
on the principle of compensation. There is an important difference between
a typical prenatal injury case, where the mother has also been legally
wronged and recovery can therefore be allowed for all the damages naturally
resulting from the original tortious act to the mother, whether foreseen
or not, 137 and a case of the sort hypothesized, where the defendant has not
harmed the mother. No doubt recovery in the latter case could be ration-
alized by conceiving of the maternal-fetal complex as a single entity to which
harm has been done. But to attach liability here for what may well have
been trivial conduct would be to impose on everyone the widest sort of
independent duty toward unborn children. There was much discussion
when recovery for negligent infliction of emotional disturbance was first
considered as to whether there should be any duty at all to avoid upsetting
another's emotions.138 Recovery in the case hypothesized would impose an
even stricter standard of care than that which evolved from those discus-
sions. Perhaps this would be a fitting situation for the law to limit lia-
bility either by means of an unforeseen consequences rule or-more in
harmony with negligence law in this country-to hold that a defendant who
had no reason to anticipate that a particular act would create a risk of harm
to the fetus was not negligent toward it.139 Balancing the interests in this
unique area is a difficult problem, but medicine may soon force the law to
make a choice.
At the present time, however, it is unlikely that plaintiffs will be able
to find a great deal of medical authority to support their claims. In the case
of shock, the danger of fictitious claims is diminished, since the effect on the
mother is both more severe and demonstrable. 40 Even here, however, the
136 See KROGER & FREED, PsycHosoMATIc GYNECOLOGY 11-23 (1951) ; Montagu,
Constitutional and Prenatal Factors in Infant and Child Health, in SYmpOsUm ON
THE HEALTHY PERSONALITY, SUPP. II: PROBLEMS OF INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD 148,
152-59 (Senn. ed. 1950); Norris, Prenatal Factors in Intellectual and Emotional
Development, 172 A.M.A.J. 413 (1960).
137 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.3, at 1029-30 (1956).
138 See works cited note 127 supra.
13 9 But see Christianson v. Chicago, St. P.M. & 0. Ry., 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W.
640 (1896) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 48, at 260 (2d ed. 1955). The RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 313 (1934) takes the position that the actor is "liable to the other [party] for illness
or bodily harm of which the distress is a legal cause if the actor (a) should have
realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, other-
wise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and (b) from facts
known to him should have realized that the distress, if it were caused, might result in
illness or bodily harm."
140 See Beal, mupra note 120.
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effects on the fetus of the basic changes in the mother's biological processes
are not fully understood. When the mother experiences a simple emotional
disturbance, the effects on the fetus are even more speculative.' 4 ' The
body under stress is known to undergo certain fundamental changes, 42 but
the effects of these changes on the fetus are not definitively established.
3. Abortion and Premature Labor
An accident may result in premature termination of the pregnancy 143
by abortion if it occurs before the fetus is viable, by premature labor if
afterwards. 1' Legally, this distinction is seldom made, the term mis-
carriage being used to cover both processes. However, the stage of preg-
nancy when the accident occurs can be medically crucial. By definition,
the fetus cannot survive an abortion. But it can survive premature labor
if the accident which induced labor did not also inflict serious injury
on the fetus. Strictly speaking, the term prenatal injury, as used in the
law, refers only to the action of an infant who has survived an accident
although maimed by it.145 However, kindred problems are raised in cases
involving prematurity and death; in fact, the action under death statutes-
at least as they are interpreted by most courts-is derived from the action
for prenatal injuries. 146
a. Death
Miscarriage cases are not new. Pregnant women have long been
allowed to recover for their own injuries attending a miscarriage caused
141 See LEViNSON & BIGLER, MENTAL RETARDATION IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN
56 (1960). See generally MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 169-216 (1962). The
relation of maternal emotional disturbance to abortion is also somewhat conjectural.
See Diddle, Trazna and Interruption of Pregnancy, 44 TEXAS STATE J. MF. 520, 523
(1948); Wilson & Smith, Abortion as Related to Trauma, Clin. Obstet. & Gyne,
March 1959, pp. 13, 17-20. For a recent suggestion that toxemia may be related to
emotional disturbance, see Salerno, Psychophysiologic Aspects of the Toxemias of
Pregnancy, 76 AMER. J. OBSTET. & GYNEc. 1268 (1953). The hypothesis is somewhat
speculative-the exact cause of toxemia is not known-but if the relationship can be
established it will have very important legal consequences. Toxemia is known to have
very deleterious effects on the fetus, among which are prenatal death, prematurity,
oxygen deficiency as a result of placental insufficiency, and intrauterine growth
retardation. Desmond, Franklin, Blattner & Hill, supra note 97, at 426. See generally
DEXTER & WEISS, PREECLAMPTIC AND EcLAmpTIc TOXEMIA OF PREGNANCY (1941);
WILLIAMS, OBSTETRICS 687-746 (11th ed. Eastman 1956); McCartney, Toxeinia of
Pregnancy, in DELEE, OBSTETRICS 379-408 (12th ed. Greenhill 1960).
142 See works cited in note 136 supra. One of the most characteristic of these
processes is the secretion of certain hormones by the adrenal cortex, the so-called
alarm reaction. See CANTAROW & SCHEPARTZ, BIOCHEMISTEY 415-16, 658 (2d ed.
1957).
143 See Medicolegal Aspects of Abortion, Current Med., Nov. 1953, p. 21.
'44 See DaLE, OBSTETRICS 169 (12th ed. Greenhill 1960).
145 Of course, a premature child who survives premature birth can be the victim
of prenatal injuries in the same way as a full-term child; in addition, prematurity
itself can handicap him in such a way as to be legally compensable. See text accom-
panying notes 167-69, 171 infra. In either case the infant can recover in a prenatal
injury action if proof is adequate.
146 See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
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by a defendant's negligence.' 47 However, the development of liability for
prenatal injuries has given these cases new significance.148  Now, in addi-
tion to the woman's recovery for her own injuries, an action can be brought
for the death of a child who was viable when the accident occurred. 49 In
most cases the miscarriage is directly related to fetal death: in abortion, the
miscarriage, by definition, causes death; in premature labor, an accompany-
ing injury-the severity of which can usually be accurately judged by the
appearance of the dead fetus '__, alone or in conjunction with the mis-
carriage, causes death.'15 The problem of proof, therefore, is basically no
different in these cases than it was when only the mother had a cause of
action. The causal relation between the accident and the miscarriage must
be shown, to establish a chain of causation from the negligent conduct to
the damage suffered by the fetus.
In some cases the cause and effect relationship is so obvious that the
death action will be able to get to the jury without the aid of expert testi-
mony-if the mother dies as a result of the accident and the fetus dies with
her or, in most cases, if the accident causes the mother to abort on the
spot.1 2  Ordinarily, however, expert testimony will be necessary. Med-
ically, at least three elements are required to establish causation: the course
of the pregnancy before the accident must have been normal; 163 pathological
examination of the abortus must reveal no evidence of abnormal develop-
ment ;'5 and the interval between the alleged injury and the onset of bleed-
147 See, e.g., Thomas v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1, 58 Pac. 315 (1899) ; Finer v. Nichols,
158 Mo. App. 539, 138 S.W. 889 (1911).
1 48 An action by the mother for her own injuries is not res judicata in a subse-
quent action brought by the child. See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d
691 (1951). In addition, the statute of limitations on the child's suit will usually not
run while he is a minor. This is of great importance, since in many cases congenital
defects caused by prenatal injuries are not immediately discernible. See WxrLLis,
OasT=vcs 1029 (11th ed. Eastman 1956). Of course, an action for prenatal injuries
would probably not succeed before the damage is realized. PRossm, TORTS § 35, at
165 (2d ed. 1955). Compare Delatte v. United States Fed. & Guar. Co., 116 So. 2d
169 (La. Ct. App. 1959) (mother's action for damages for mental suffering caused
by knowledge that premature placental separation was likely to cause later mental
difficulties in the child allowed).
149 See notes 51-66 supra and accompanying text.
150 See Hertig, Minimal Criteria Required to Prove Prima Facie Case of Trau-
nmatic Abortion or Miscarriage, 117 ANN. STJRG. 596, 598, 604-05 (1943) ; sources cited
note 80 supra.
151 Fetal death sometimes precedes and itself tends to cause the miscarriage, but
this is of no legal importance and can be considered with the typical case.
152 See Superior Transfer Co. v. Halstead, 189 Md. 536, 56 A.2d 706 (1948). In
this case the macerated condition of the fetus made it likely that its death caused the
miscarriage; the court held, therefore, that medical testimony was necessary to prove
the cause of death.
153 If the courts required extensive evidence of this element, most cases would
fail of proof. See Miller, Trauma and Compensation in Gynecology and Obstetrics,
26 Am R. J. Oa'rET. & GYNEC. 839, 843-45 (1933). It is possible to examine the
fetus only after it has been delivered-x-rays are usually not very helpful. Cf. Hertig,
supra note 160, at 605. But see note 265 infra. It is impossible to tell conclusively
if the course of the pregnancy was normal. Absent any known adverse elements, all
a physician can say is that to the best of his knowledge the pregnancy was normal.
154 There are many internal factors that could cause fetal death. See works cited
note 80 mupra.
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ing or other signs of imminent abortion must be slight-a matter of minutes
or, at most, a few hours.155 Since proof of this sort is seldom presented,156
the consensus of medical writers is that all too often justice is not served
in miscarriage cases, that many times damages are awarded when the
physical or psychic trauma of the accident were only coincidently in-
volved.157 The physicians justify their concern by noting the high per-
centage of pregnancies that end in spontaneous abortion without any
apparent external cause, 158 the number of women who are habitual
aborters,159 and, in contrast, the frequency of instances in which severe
mechanical injury-many times inflicted by a direct blow on the mother's
abdomen-has been shown to have had no such effect. 160  In addition, the
estimated large number of induced abortions 11 suggest that parents often
do not want the child.16 2 An accident may present a tempting occasion to
terminate the pregnancy and at the same time to recover damages. While
medical men admit that a causal relation can exist,1 3 their inability to find
it in many of the cases allowing recovery points up the danger in permitting
a miscarriage to be the basis of a death action.
b. Prematurity
If an accident occurs before pregnancy reaches full term but while the
fetus is viable, and the injury to the mother is severe enough to cause a mis-
carriage but not fetal death, a premature baby will be born.164 The organs
155 See Hertig, supra note 150, at 606; Diddle, supra note 141, at 523-24.
156 Cf. Miller, supra note 153, at 843.
157 Hertig, supra note 150, at 596. See also H. Smith, supra note 128, at 291-96.
But see note 223 infra and accompanying text.
158 See Hertig, supra note 150, at 598 (consensus that "at least ten or more per
cent of all pregnancies terminate in spontaneous abortion . . . .") ; ROSEN, THERA-
PEUTIC ABORTION 22-23 (1954) (estimating at least 257).
159 See JAvERT, SPONTANEOUS AND HABITUAL ABORTIONS 159-60 (1957).
160 See DELEt, OBSTTRICS 440 (12th ed. Greenhill 1960) ; Diddle, siupra note 141,
at 523; Wilson & Smith, Abortion as Related to Trauma, Cln. Obstet. & Gynec.,
March 1959, pp. 13, 19.
161 See GRAY, ATTORNEYS' TEXTBO K OF MEnDCINE 698, 711 (2d ed. 1940);
WL.LIAMS, OBSTm CS 351-53 (11th ed. Eastman 1956); Warkany & Kalter, Con-
genital Malformnations, 265 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 1046 (1961) ; Whitehouse & McKeown,
Note on the Significance of Attempted Abortion in the Aetiology of Congenital
Abnormalities, 63 J. OsTFT. GYNAEC. BRIT. EMp. 224 (1956). Of course, there is
no way in which the number of attempts can be accurately established.
162 Cf. DELER, OBSTETRICS 317 (12th ed. Greenhill 1960).
163 See JAVERT, SPONTANEOUS AND HABITuAL ABORTIONS 241 (1957); LINDSAY,
TRAUMA AND COMPENSATION IN OBsTERIC AND GYNAECOLOGICAL CASES 41-42 (1928) ;
TAUSSiG, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED 114 (1936). But see Wilson &
Smith, supra note 141, at 19-20.
104 See Brown, Lyon & Anderson, Causes of Prematurity, VIII: Influence of
Infections, Chronic Disorders and Accidents on the Incidence of Prematurity, 72
AMER. J. Dis. CnI.D. 189 (1946). The authors conclude that accidents are not a
large cause of prematurity. The proof problem of relating the miscarriage to the
accident will be the same as in death cases. See Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d
847 (1947) (premature infant born sicldy and died three months later; held, no
recovery because of failure of proof connecting premature birth with assault by de-
fendant).
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of the child will have not reached their full growth,165 and, of course, the
further the miscarriage is from full term, the poorer will be the infant's
chances to survive and lead a normal life.166
The great expansion of prenatal injury law since Bonbrest has, obvi-
ously, as much application to premature as to full-term infants. The injury
-aside from negligently inflicted congenital defects and deformities which
can be suffered as readily by premature as by full-term infants-is pre-
maturity itself and its attendant consequences. It is now recognized that
the premature child can suffer severe handicaps because of his untimely
birth, the damage generally being inversely proportional to the stage of
development at the time of miscarriage. 67 Because he is not fully developed
physiologically and anatomically, the premature infant who survives is not
only handicapped 168 but also tends to be more susceptible to early childhood
disorders than the full-term infant.169 The legal significance of this fact
may be seen in the case of a premature child who contracts a neonatal infec-
tion which has severe adverse consequences. The child's action for prenatal
injuries will rest on the theory that his weakened condition resulting from
premature birth was responsible for his subsequent illness, or, possibly, the
severity of its effects. Although this argument is plausible, in most cases
physicians will not be able to state positively that the child would not have
been similarly afflicted if he had been born at full term. Until some more
definite relationship is established between prematurity and neonatal infec-
165 An infant weighing 5Y2 pounds or less at birth is regarded as premature,
regardless of the period of gestation. Thus, by medical standards, some full-term
but underweight infants will be considered premature. The reason for this classi-
fication is that generally speaking organic development is proportional to weight.
See CROSSE, THE PREMATURE BABY 1 (3d ed. 1952),; DUNHAM, PREMATURE INFANTS
3 (3d ed. 1961); MORISON, FOETAL AND NEONATAL PATHOLOGY 73 (1952).
166 Death due to prematurity per se is usually the result of failure of the lungs,
the least developed organs of premature infants, to expand properly-primary and
secondary atelectasis. See PoTTER, PATHOLOGY OF THE FETUS AND THE NEWBORN
71-72 (1952). See also Taylor, Phalen & Dyer, Effect of Obstetric Difficulties and
Maternal Disease on Premature Infant Mortality, 141 A.M.A.J. 904 (1949). See
generally Labate, A Study of the Causes of Fetal and Neonatal Mortality on the
Obstetric Service of Bellevue Hospital, 54 AMER. 3. OBsTET. & GYNEC. 188 (1947).
One case illustrates a neonatal death from prematurity per se. See Pan-American Cas.
Co. v. Reed, 240 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 819 (1957) (cause of action
allowed when premature baby died forty-six hours after birth from atelectasis-
whether accident caused the premature birth is for the jury). Of course, if the pre-
mature child does not survive, a death action will lie. See Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d
352 (La. Ct. App. 1923) ; Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d
912 (1960); Jasinky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
167 See works cited note 165 supra. In two cases it was alleged that the plaintiff
was born premature and blind due to defendant's negligence. Damasiewicz v. Gor-
such, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951) (cause of action upheld and case remanded) ;
Cavanaugh v. First Natl Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952) (no
cause of action, old rule).
168 See CROSSE, THE PREMATURE BABY 82-117 (3d ed. 1952) ; MORISoN, FOETAL
AND NEONATAL PATHOLOGY 80-84 (1952). Tests given to matched sets of children
in the early years of life have shown that those born prematurely have poorer vision
than those born at full term. See Eames, Eye Conditions Among Children of Pre-
mature, Full-term and Hypernature Birth, 29 AMER. J. OPHTHAL. 57 (1946).
169 See CRossE, THE PREMATURE BABY 129-51 (3d ed. 1952) ; WATSON & LowRY,
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN 82-85 (2d ed. 1954).
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tion-and, by analogy, permanent handicaps-the position of the Restate-
ment of Torts should govern.
If the negligent actor is liable for another's injury which so
lowers the other's vitality as to render him peculiarly susceptible
to disease, the actor is also liable for a disease which is contracted
because of the lowered vitality170
With regard to permanent handicaps, studies have only recently been
undertaken to compare premature infants with matched controls in later
stages of life, in order to see if such handicaps may be a result of pre-
maturity per se.171  At the present time, therefore, it seems advisable for
the courts to impose proximate cause limitations on recovery in novel
cases.
D. Persons Who May Be Held Liable
1. Professional Malpractice Liability
The difficulty of establishing a breach of duty toward the mother does
not necessarily negate the existence of a duty toward the child. This may
be best illustrated by the relation of a physician to the mother and unborn
child. Malpractice actions have already been brought for the negligent
administration of irradiation treatment to the mother that affected the
child,". 2 and for negligent delivery. 173  Increased medical knowledge of
7 0 
REsTATEmENT, TORTS § 458 (1934); see Pan-American Cas. Co. v. Reed,
240 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 819 (1955). Unlike the usual prenatal
injury case, an action of this sort does not encounter an initial cause-in-fact problem,
liability for the premature birth having already been established.
171 For examples of such studies, see Harper, Fischer & Rider, Neurological
and Intellectual Status of Prematures at Three to Five Years of Age, 55 J. PFDIAT.
679 (1959); Knehr & Sobol, Mental Ability of Prematurely Born Children at Early
School Age, 27 J. PsYcHoL. 355 (1949); Knobloch, Rider, Harper & Pasamanick,
Neuropsychiatric Sequelae of Prematurity, 161 A.M.A.J. 581 (1956). See generally
HESS, MOHR & BARTELME, THE PHYSICAL AND MENTAL GROWTH OF PREMATURELY
BORN CHILDREN 57-217 (1934); Benton, Mental Development of Prematurely Born
Children, 10 AwER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 719 (1940).
372 See Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939) ; Stemmer v.
Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942). Both cases denied
recovery and both have been overruled, see Amann v. Faidy, 415 IU. 422, 114 N.E.2d
412 (1953) (death action); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
In both cases the physician negligently misdiagnosed the mother's condition as a
tumor and administered irradiation treatments which harmed the child: in Smith,
the infant died after birth; in Stemmer, he was born a microcephalic. These treat-
ments involved therapeutic doses, which are much stronger than the amounts used
for diagnosis. See generally Dunlap, Medicolegal Aspects of Infuries from Exposure
to Roentgen Rays and Radioactive Substances, 1 OccuP. M . 237 (1946); note 6
supra. It is possible that even diagnostic doses could be harmful to the fetus. See
MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 462 (1962). For some of the problems which would
be raised if such a discovery were made, see notes 177-81 infra and accompanying text.
'73 See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), notes 42-43 vupra and
accompanying text; Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1939) ; Verkeunes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) ; Rainey
v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1954). All four cases allowed a cause of action,
although Scott was controlled by a specific California statute. See also Birmingham
Baptist Hosp. v. Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 118 So. 741 (1928); Kirk v. Middlebrook,
201 Mo. 245, 100 S.W. 450 (1907).
[Vo1.110:553
PRENATAL INJURIES
the causes of congenital defects, by widening the scope of the cause of action
for prenatal injuries, is going to affect physicians in two ways, first, by
limiting the techniques by which the mother may properly be treated, as
certain procedures are found to be detrimental to the fetus, and second, by
expanding the list of affirmative measures, found to be helpful to the fetus,
which physicians must employ. And physicians will be duty bound to keep
Up with recent medical advances in this area to the same extent as others
similarly situated. 74
The situation in which certain treatments can no longer be used is
exemplified by the administration of drugs for the mother's welfare during
pregnancy. 75 It seems inevitable that some of these drugs will be found
to have toxic or depressant effects on the fetus.' 76  Assuming the doctor
knew or should have known that the fetus could or would be affected,
77
to what extent should the defense that the drugs were administered for the
mother's welfare prevail? In most cases it can be assumed that the treat-
ment was intended to, and in fact did, benefit the mother. The merit of the
defense would seem to depend on two conditions: the actual necessity for
the mother to have received the benefit and the possibility that alternative
means, less detrimental to the fetus, might have been used to effect the same
'74 McHugh v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 394, 399 (M.D. Pa. 1947); Adkins v. Ropp,
105 Ind. App. 331, 334, 14 N.E.2d 727, 728 (1938) ; Viita v. Fleming, 132 Minn. 128,
136-37, 155 N.W. 1077, 1080-81 (1916). The only difficult issue involved here is the
period of "grace" which will be allowed a physician before he is held to the duty of
being acquainted with a certain development. The problem is illustrated by the
history of retrolental fibroplasia, a disease affecting premature infants which results
in blindness. Since such infants are frequently cyanotic at birth, it is customary to
give them oxygen therapy. However, in 1954-55 it was discovered that RLF was
being caused by the treatment and that by reducing the oxygen concentration below
forty per cent, the blindness could be averted while the therapy remained effective.
Articles on this phenomenon were immediately published in leading periodicals. As
a result of the findings RLF is now almost entirely preventable. It has been suggested
that all physicians will be held to have constructive knowledge of these developments
in suits arising from treatments occurring later than 1956. See Robins, Retrolental
Fibroplasia: The Story of Baby Mary, 1960 TRIAL & TORT TRENDS 561, 568. See
also Pediatric Herald, March 1961, p. 7, col. 3. See generally Ingalls, Preventive
Prenatal Pediatrics, 6 ADVANCE: PrDIAT. 33 (1953); Sadusk, Hazardous Fields of
Medicine in Relation to Professional Liability, 163 A.M.A.J. 953 (1957).
175 See WINDLE, AsPHYXIA NEoNATRUM: ITS RELATION TO THE FETAL BLOOD,
CIRCULATION AND RESPIRATION AND ITS EFFECTS UPON THE BRAIN 53-54 (1950).
176 See Lucey, Hazards to the Newborn Infant from Drugs Administered to
the Mother, 8 PEDIAT. CLIN. N. AMR. 413 (1961); Sandberg, Drugs in Pregnancy,
94 CAL. MED. 287 (1961). See generally MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 322-56
(1962). Sedatives administered to the mother have already been found to have an
adverse effect on the fetus. See Cole, Kimball & Daniels, Etiologic Factors in Neonatal
Asphyxia, 113 A.M.AJ. 2038, 2044 (1939) ; Montagu, sipra note 136, at 162-63.
177 Even though there are no known adverse effects on the fetus of many new
drugs--diuretics, oral hypoglycemic agents, tranquilizers, etc.-it does not follow that
the doctor should administer them to the mother indiscriminately. See Lucey, mepra
note 176, at 418. The detrimental possibilities are sufficient to make it mandatory
that the physician have good reason to use such drugs-even if the adverse effects
are not substantiated by medical research until after the treatment questioned.
The fact that physicians must rely heavily on advertising statements of drug
manufacturers, see Hearings on Administered Prices Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 18, at 10245-46 (1960), raises interesting questions about the manufacturers'
potential liability. See generally 2 FRUmER & FRIEDmAN, PRODUCTS LIAnmrr
§§32-34 (1961).
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result. As in the usual malpractice case, the question of whether the de-
fendant lived up to the standards of his profession will be a subject for
expert testimony. 78 Except in a clear case, however, it is questionable
whether the jury, with a maimed child before it, should be allowed to decide
by hindsight-on the basis of conflicting expert testimony-that the physi-
cian made the wrong choice. 179 A physician's decision is frequently the sum
of possibilities; in cases of genuine doubt it is not only reasonable but
expected that the mother will be his primary concern. If the fetus is
injured it does not automatically follow that the physician erred; by acting
for the mother's benefit, he may have saved her from serious harm I 0 _
which itself might have had adverse effects upon the fetus."" The physi-
cian should not be obliged to guess at his peril; but he should be required
to shift his attention from a predominant concern for the mother to a dual
regard for the mother and the fetus to the extent it is reasonable to do so.
Medical advancements may also increase the number of affirmative
acts which the physician will be required to take for the welfare of the
fetus. A closer supervision of the maternal diet during pregnancy-of
extreme importance to the fetus ' 8Z-may be the most basic requirement.
The mother's diet can affect the fetus either directly, by the transmission
of nutriment, or indirectly, by so affecting the mother's health as eventually
to harm the fetus.'8 3  A remarkable study has been made that tends to
correlate mental deficiency in children and a lowered protein intake of
mothers in summertime.18 4  Although far from definitive, it suggests the
positive supervisory role that physicians should be required to assume in
prescribing a prenatal diet. The duty imposed on the physician to perform
this function may properly be more absolute than that requiring him to
1"78 See cases cited note 174 supra. See generally LOUiSELL & WIL.IAMS, TRIAL
OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 8.04 (1960).
119 See Note, 9 W. REs. L. REv. 499, 506 (1956).
180 See, e.g., Harill, Jarman & Wynne, Fetal Effects of Radioactive Iodine
Therapy in a Pregnant Woman With Thyroid Cancer, 81 AMER. J. OBsrET. & GY.NEc.
1018 (1961).
181 It is dear, for instance, that an infectious disease in the mother can seriously
affect the fetus. See note 97 supra. See also note 185 infra.
182 WATSON & LOwREY, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN 21-24 (24d ed.
1954) ; Montagu, supra note 136, at 159-62; Warkany, Some Factors in the Etiology
of Congenital Malformation, 50 AMER. J. MENT. DEFIc. 231, 236-40 (1945). See also
Desmond, Franklin, Blattner & Hill, The Relation of Maternal Disease to Fetal and
Neonatal Morbidity and Mortality, 8 PEDIAT. CLIN. N. AMER. 421, 424 (1961). Except
in the case of endemic cretinism, which is related to maternal iodine deficiency,
Warkany & Kalter, supra note 161, at 1047, no clear correlations between specific
dietary deficiencies and resulting defects have been found, Warkany, Congenital Mal-
formations Induced by Maternal Dietary Deficiency, 13 Nuni. REv. 289 (1955).
183 See generally MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 57-112 (1962). Chronic
undernutrition has already been shown to be related to premature labor and toxemia.
See Tompkins, Wiehl & Mitchell, The Underweight Patient as an Increased Obstetric
Hazard, 69 AMER. J. OBsrr. & GYNEC. 114 (1955).
184 This relationship was shown in pregnancies which had their first trimester
in the summer, the fetus being more susceptible to deficiencies while in the develop-
mental stage. See Knobloch & Pasamanick, Seasonal Variations in the Births of the
Mentally Deficient, 48 AMER. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1201 (1958); Pasamanick & Kno-
bloch, Seasonal Variations in Complications of Pregnancy, 12 OBSTET. & GYNEc.
110 (1958).
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choose between alternative treatments for the mother, because the counter-
vailing consideration of detriment to the mother will not usually be
present.
185
2. Maternal Liability
There is no longer any doubt that the mother can play a large part in
causing congenital defects; indeed, in nearly all prenatal injury cases the
immediate cause of the anomaly can be traced to some maternal process.
The considerations raised in connection with third-party tortfeasors are
equally relevant when the mother is the negligent party. The most usual
situations in which the mother might bear sole responsibility would be
ordinary vehicular and household accidents. In addition, careless exposure
to infectious diseases, 8 6 maintaining an inadequate diet,' 8 7 obesity,18s using
narcotics, 8 9 excessive smoking," ° or any other practice leading to a
maternal imbalance may affect the fetus adversely. There is therefore no
unusual difficulty of medical proof that would necessarily foreclose a
successful action for prenatal injuries against the mother.
Traditionally, however, an unemancipated minor child has not been
permitted to sue a parent for what otherwise would have been tortious
conduct.191 This rule rested mainly upon a policy consideration of preserv-
ing family harmony, 92 but some courts, finding that rationale unrealistic
in certain circumstances, have imposed limitations on its application.193
The existing exceptions, together with the possibility that in the future the
courts may see fit to discard the rule entirely, will present situations in
which there is no substantive obstacle to the child's bringing an action
against his mother for prenatal injuries.
185 To the extent that a physician is engaged to prepare a woman for pregnancy,
he might also be legally required to immunize her, where practicable, against common
infectious diseases which would be harmful to a fetus, such as german measles, see
notes 77, 97 .rupra and accompanying text. See Pediatric Herald, Feb. 1961, p. 7,
col. 3. Vaccinations have too many potential ill effects on the fetus to be administered
during the course of pregnancy.
186 See note 97 supra.
187 See note 182 supra and accompanying text.
188 See Mullins, Overweight in Pregnaicy, [1960] 1 LANCET 146.
189 See Desmond, Franklin, Blattner & Hill, =pra note 182, at 432-33.
190 See Frazier, Davis, Goldstein & Goldberg, Cigarette Smoking and Preina-
turity: a Prospective Study, 81 AmER. J. OasTE. & GYNEC. 988 (1961); Montagu,
Constitutional and Prenatal Factors in Infant and Child Health, in Symosium ON
THE HEALTHY PERSONALITY, SuPP. II: PRO1LEiIS OF INFANCY AND CHILDH00D 148,
163 (Senn. ed. 1950).
191 See Redwine v. Adkins, 339 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1960) ; Hastings v. Hastings,
33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960) ; Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
192 See I HA ER & JAmES, TORTS § 8.11, at 648-49 (1956); PRoSsER, TORTS
§ 1.01, at 675-77 (2d ed. 1955).
193 Thus, the family harmony rationale has been held inapplicable where the
parent's act resulted in the death of the child, see, e.g., Harlan Natl Bank v. Gross,
346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1961); cf. Lasecld v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33
(1940) (death of parent) ; where the misconduct took place in the course of vocational,
as opposed to parental, activity, see Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343
(1939) ; Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952) ; cf. Parks v. Parks,
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However, while one may reject both the family harmony rationale as
usually applied -4 and the old bar to actions for prenatal injuries, the ob-
jection to a suit by a child against his mother for prenatal injuries are clearly
greater than the sum of these two parts. It seems fundamentally unjust to
allow such an action, 95 but the conclusion is difficult to articulate in terms of
legal doctrine. To draw a fanciful analogy, the child could be considered
a gratuitous licensee while en ventre sa mere, similar to a guest in a
private automobile the driver of which, under the guest statutes,1 6 is only
liable for gross negligence. The comparison may seem ludicrous, but the
policy behind the rule would seem to apply to the prenatal injury situation.
Although the fetus certainly cannot be said to have "assumed the risk,"
the talisman often used to justify limiting recovery in auto cases, 97 a strong
policy behind the rule would seem to be that a person bestowing a benefit-
in this case bringing the child into the world-should not be held to as high
a degree of care to the beneficiary as a stranger would be.'
Putting aside the unlikelihood that such actions will be allowed, the
question remains whether this problem is at all realistic. In most cases,
no one in a position to bring an action on behalf of the child would be
390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) ; and where the misconduct was intentional rather
than merely negligent, see Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956);
Siembab v. Siembab, 284 App. Div. 652, 134 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1954); Cowgill v. Boock,
189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
194 Cases are fought in the courtroom and not in the home-especially when an
insurer is the real party in interest. (A parent's coverage by liability insurance,
however, does not in itself change the normal rule. Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832,
144 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Worral v. Moran, 101 N.H. 13, 131 A.2d 438 (1957).
Compare Worrell v. Worrell, sitpra note 193.) It has been suggested that if domestic
tranquility is upset, the tortious conduct itself, rather than the subsequent trial, will
have been the cause. See 1 HAPaE, & JAMES, TORTS § 8.11, at 648-50 (1956).
195 The most fantastic case that can be postulated is that of a mother whose
health is such that if she should become pregnant it might have an adverse effect
on the fetus. Assuming that the mother takes the risk and the baby is born maimed,
to allow recovery would be to recognize a legal interest in not being conceived. If
conception was first made dangerous by a physical injury inflicted on the mother
by the negligent act of a third party, the mother's recovery should probably include
damages for the harm done to this aspect of her marital interest. Cf. Firenze v. State,
208 Misc. 663, 145 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Ct. Cl. 1955), aff'd mein., 1 App. Div. 2d 934, 150
N.Y.S.2d 572 (1956); 2 B~zur, MODERN DAMAGES § 261 (1960). An action by the
offspring of a later pregnancy against the original tortfeasor should be barred by a
prior recovery by the mother. Compare note 77 .rpra.
196 See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 16.15, at 951 n.4 (1956).
197 See generally Rice, The Automobile Guest and the Rationale of Assumption
of Risk, 27 MINN. L. Rxv. 323 (1943). Infants too young to assume the risk have
been held not to be guests within the statute. Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245,
44 P.2d 478 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935); Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d
262 (1950). Contra, Horst v. Holtzen, 249 Iowa 958, 90 N.W.2d 41 (1958).
198 It is noteworthy, however, that in the absence of statute most courts only
hold the driver to the standard of ordinary care. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
§ 16.15, at 950-51 (1956). (Compare also the common-law rule that imposes liability
for lack of ordinary care in aiding a person in peril--due to no negligence on the
part of the would-be rescuer-although there is initially no legal obligation to act
affirmatively. See PROSSER, TORTS § 38, at 184-88 (2d ed. 1955).) The courts
have been unwilling to change the rule on their own initiative. The prenatal injury
case, however, is a more compelling one for denying relief, regardless of its legal
rationalization.
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motivated to sue the child's mother, and even if he were, the difficulties of
uncovering adequate evidence would be great. But there are three situa-
tions in which the mother's potential liability to the child might have prac-
tical importance. The first-the only maternal conduct for which a finding
of liability is dearly justifiable 199-is where the mother has attempted un-
successfully to terminate the pregnancy prematurely by drugs or other
means; 2 00 the second is where the mother has been solely responsible for
an accident but is covered by liability insurance; 2 0 1 and the third is the
accident case where the mother was one of two or more joint tortfeasors.
202
In each of these situations evidence of the tortious act will be available,
and parental influence to bring suit may be present. The joint tortfeasor
case, however, is significant not for its bearing on the mother's liability
but for its relevance to the practical consideration of the responsibility of
the other tortfeasor. If the mother may be liable for prenatal injuries, then
a simple joint tortfeasor situation is presented; the child can recover the
entire amount of his damages from the other tortfeasor, who, in turn, may
be able to recover contribution from the mother.20 3  On the other hand, if
it is decided that the mother shall not be responsible for the negligent in-
fliction of prenatal injuries, the question is what effect the mother's negli-
gence should have on the child's action against the other tortfeasor. It
would seem that if the accident would not have occurred without the
mother's negligent participation the third party should be free from respon-
sibility-at least if contribution is not allowed. But under the legal prin-
ciple that a tortfeasor is liable for the entire loss sustained by a plaintiff,
even though his act concurred with that of another negligent-though
199 See note 193 supra. See also note 161 supra and accompanying text.
200 But, with one narrow exception, see note 81 mipra, there is presently no proven
correlation between induced abortions and congenital malformations. Fraser, Causes
of Congenital Malformation in Human Beings, 10 J. CHRON. Dis. 97-98 (1959).
See generally Whitehouse & McKeown, supra note 161. Of course, if the mother
successfully induces abortion, proof of the cause of death would be simple, although
there might be obstacles to recovery by the estate. Compare note 202 infra; Touriel
v. Benveniste, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2203 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 1961).
201 Although the risk of upsetting family harmony in insurance cases is almost
nonexistent, the courts have not excepted them from the general prohibition. See
note 194 .mpra. The conceptual difficulty of considering an insurer to be an inde-
pendent party is in large part responsible for these decisions: the courts reason that
liability insurance does not create liability but only recompenses it when it exists.
See Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Hastings v. Hastings, 33
N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170
(1953). But cf. Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). It must be
recognized, of course, that the danger of collusion, present in any insurance-covered
situation, is somewhat greater here.
.202The mother's negligence would not be "imputed" to the fetus so as to bar
recovery by the child. Cf. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 490 (1936). In a death action,
however, where the mother has been contributorily negligent, recovery by the estate
may be denied-at least as to any amount allocable to the mother. Cf. Nichols v.
Nashville Housing Authority, 187 Tenn. 683, 216 S.W.2d 694 (1949). Compare
Pike v. Adams, 99 N.H. 221, 103 A.2d 55 (1954). See generally PROSSER, TORTS
§ 105, at 718-19 (2d ed. 1955).
o203 Most states-utilizing a policy comparable to that which bars recovery by
a contributorily negligent plaintiff-deny recovery of contribution. 1 HARPEa &
JAMES, TORTS § 10.2, at 714-15 (1956); see, e.g., Gobble v. Bradford, 226 Ala. 517,
147 So. 619 (1933).
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immune-party to produce the result, the child could recover all his dam-
ages from the third party.204
III. PROBLEMS OF PROOF
A. Cause-in-Fact: Difference Between Medical and Legal Standards
For a better understanding of the basis of medico-legal conflicts as to
the justification for many prenatal injury awards, a brief exploration of
terminology is needed. The term "cause" has a narrower meaning for the
physician than for the lawyer. The doctor tends to look to the immediate
pathological cause of an injury or condition, to the exclusion of other
factors. 5  This attitude is strikingly illustrated by Miami Coal Co. v.
Luce.20 6 There the deceased was severely injured in a mine explosion,
receiving a deep scalp wound, numerous lacerations, fractures of both ankles
and both legs, a possible broken vertebra, and other grave injuries. He lay
in a coma for sixteen days and then died. Two of four doctors making
statements in a workmen's compensation proceeding brought by his widow
ascribed death to an intestinal obstruction and other causes independent of
the injuries received in the explosion. A third theorized that the explosion
might have had something to do with the death. Only the fourth doctor
attributed death to the injuries received from the explosion. In affirming
the Industrial Board's award despite the adverse testimony of the three
physicians, the appellate court said:
The board would have been justified in rejecting entirely the
opinions of Dr. Danner and Dr. Johnson and in relying on the
opinion of Dr. White. But fortunately in this case the board was
not limited to opinion evidence. It was the duty of the members
of the board to bring to bear their experience and knowledge, and
to exercise their reasoning powers. Indeed, if it were not for the
saving grace of what we call common sense, justice would be
defeated in almost every case where opinion evidence is ad-
mitted.
2 07
The scientific method, however, demands proof of causation beyond a
reasonable doubt; anything less is unacceptable 20 8
204 See Redwine v. Adkins, 339 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1960). Since the mother is
not a tortfeasor as to the child, it is questionable in this situation whether in those
states that allow contribution the third-party tortfeasor could recover from her what
would otherwise have been her share of the damages. It would seem that such
recovery should be allowed; otherwise, the family entity would be "unjustly" enriched.
But cf. Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950). If this recovery
is allowed, however, it would make no practical difference whether or not the mother
is considered independently liable to the child.
205 Cohen, Uncertainties of Medical Proof-What Should Be Done, 1959 TRIAL
& ToRT TRENDS 69, 72-73; Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal
Conflicts in the Concept of Causation, 31 TEXAs L. REv. 630, 648-51 (1953). See
also Medical-Legal Problenms and Their Solutions, 165 A.M.A.J. 699, 702 (1957).
206 76 Ind. App. 245, 131 N.E. 824 (1921) ; see Small, supra note 205, at 649-50.
207 76 Ind. App. at 249, 131 N.E. at 826.
208 See Cancer in General and Judicial Reasoning, Current Med., Sept 1954,
p. 36, at 38. See generally Morris, Justice and Scientific Method, 60 COLUM. L. REv.
936 (1960).
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To the law, the exact, split-second pathological cause of an injury is
only the final step in a chain of causation initiated by what might have
been a tortious act. To be a cause-in-fact at law, under the traditional
preponderance of the evidence test,2 °9 it is only necessary that a defendant's
conduct be a "substantial" or "material" factor in bringing about the
damage.210 This is broader than the medical conception of cause in two
specific respects: the initial rather than the immediate cause is emphasized,
and the concept itself is broadened to include not just a single factor, but
any conduct that substantially brings about the result. When the law looks
at two events which might be causally connected, it is less sympathetic than
medicine to notions of coincidence; it is often willing to permit a finding of
fact that post hoc ergo propter hoc.21 ' Most courts will allow reasonable
inferences to be drawn from all of the circumstances, not just the medical
testimony.212
Whereas medical testimony as to the "possibility" of a causal relation
between an accident and an injury is not sufficient, standing alone, to
establish such a relationship in most cases,213 it is usually held that medical
evidence of a "possibility," in conjunction with lay evidence indicating
209 PROSSER, TORTS § 41, at 197 (2d ed. 1955).
2 1
D
0
R.ESTATEMENT, TORTS § 431 (1934). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS §§ 20.2-.3 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 44 (2d ed. 1955); Fleming & Perry,
Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 762-83 (1951). Section 433 of the RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS (Supp. 1948) lists the following factors as relevant to the determination of
whether defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor": first, the number of other
factors which contributed in producing the harm and the extent of the effect which
they had in producing it; second, whether the actor's conduct created a force or
series of forces which were in continuous and active operation up to the time of the
harm, or created a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which
the actor was not responsible; and third, lapse of time. These criteria encompass
both cause-in-fact and proximate cause.
211 See Cancer it General and Judicial Rearoning, Current Med., Sept. 1954, p. 36,
at 38 & n.19.
212 See, e.g., Winchester Milling Corp. v. Sencindiver, 148 Va. 388, 399, 138
S.E. 479, 483 (1927), a compensation case involving cancer in which the court, in
drawing conclusions of cause and effect from external circumstances, said: "[C]ourts
will continue to [apply the ordinary rules of evidence] . . . with a full sense of
justification and without apology until the cause of cancer is definitely and scientifi-
cally established." Of course, it is ordinarily easier to prove causation in a workmen's
compensation proceeding than in a tort action, see Small, supra note 205, at 641,
but the court's statement in this case may certainly be applied to tort cases. See
note 213 infra, and accompanying text. Not all courts are so liberal in this regard.
See Payne v. Chandler, 41 Ga. App. 385, 153 S.E. 96 (1930) (evidence that plaintiff
suffered heart pain and other ailments after dentist caused her to swallow an un-
identified liquid held insufficient) ; Kramer Serv. v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So.
625 (1939) (possibility that injury caused cancer of the skin held insufficient). See
generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 20.2, at 1111-13 (1956).
213 E.g., Adelsberger v. Sheehy, 332 Mo. 954, 59 S.W.2d 644 (1933); Grace v.
Fassott, 67 App. Div. 443, 73 N.Y. Supp. 906 (1902) ; Anderson v. Baxter, 285 Pa.
443, 132 Atl. 358 (1926). Whether expert testimony in terms of "probability" should
fare any better is a point of disagreement among courts. Compare Sundquist v.
Madison Ry., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928) (probability sufficient), with Olsen
v. Texas Co., 161 So. 219 (La. Ct. App. 1935) (probability insufficient). See also
Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 501, 103 A.2d 681, 684 (1954)
(dictum) (probability insufficient). See generally 1 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 60, at
385-86 (1954); Cohen, supra note 205, at 73-79; McNeal, The Medical Expert Wit-
ness-Positive-Negative-Maybe, 25 INS. CouNsEL J. 528 (1958).
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that a causal relation exists, is sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
214
The kinds of external factors which are often used to bolster expert testi-
mony and prove causation are well illustrated by cases involving single
trauma cancer (neoplastic growths appearing in the injured area within
a short time after the accident) 215 and miscarriage (external bruises and a
short time between injury and the onset of signs of inevitable abortion).216
The importance of these factual circumstances is particularly marked in the
cancer cases, since the exact cause of cancer is not known.2 17 This prag-
matic approach of relying on external coincidence is a practical necessity: 
218
courts and juries must reach a decision; if need be, they must go beyond a
scientific determination of causation to do so.2 19
The fact that the scientific conception of cause differs markedly from
the legal attitude, both in its fundamental approach and its unwillingness
to give external circumstances controlling weight, helps to explain much
of the medical profession's criticism of many damage awards. Insofar
as this condemnation-leveled particularly at the large number of recoveries
allowed in cancer,22° miscarriage,22 ' and traumatic neurosis 222 cases-is a
result of misunderstanding or dissatisfaction with the rules of evidence and
214 See Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Ry., 185 Mass. 602, 71 N.E. 90 (1904);
Moritz v. Interurban St. Ry., 84 N.Y. Supp. 162 (App. Div. 1903) ; Reed v. Rosenthal,
129 Ore. 203, 276 Pac. 684 (1929). A fortiori the same conclusion is reached if the
medical testimony is in terms of "probability." See Ross v. Riffle, 310 Pa. 176, 164
Atl. 913 (1932) ; note 213 mtpra and accompanying text. The expert may be com-
pelled to answer questions as to "possibility" with a simple yes or no. It has been
argued that testimony of this degree of positiveness should be given no effect: medi-
cine being an inexact science, it often tacitly recognizes that "anything is possible."
McNeal, supra note 213, at 530. It would follow that cases held sufficient as to
cause-in-fact because of a concurrence of medical "possibility" and permissible lay
inference from external circumstances rest in a practical sense on exclusively non-
expert grounds. See, e.g., Ideal Food Prods. Co. v. Rupe, 76 Ariz. 175, 177, 261
P.2d 992, 993 (1953) (testimony that traumatic arthritis "could have" resulted from
the accident held sufficient).
215 See, e.g., Lee v. Blessing, 131 Conn. 569, 41 A.2d 337 (1945); Vitale v.
Duerbeck, 338 Mo. 556, 92 S.W.2d 691 (1936). Cause is even easier to establish in
cases involving the aggravation of preexisting conditions. See Shaw v. Owl Drug
Co., 4 Cal. App. 2d 191, 40 P.2d 588 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
216 See, e.g., Comeau v. Beck, 319 Mass. 17, 64 N.E.2d 436 (1946).
217 The fact that the specific etiology of a process is not known, however, does
not automatically mean that a medical man would consider a damage award to be
unfounded. In miscarriage situations, for example, although the process which im-
mediately precedes and causes the onset of labor has not been identified, in many
cases physicians would be willing to concede the existence of a causal relation on
the basis of scientific facts other than those relating to a known immediate cause.
See WIUL. s, OgsTsTRIcs 365-66 (11th ed. Eastman 1956).
218 See Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954);
Cancer in General and Judicial Reasoning, Current Med., Sept. 1954, p. 36, at 38;
notes 210-12 supra and accompanying text.
219 Current Med., Nov. 1953, p. 1. "The lawyer is not so much concerned with
'how' as with 'whether'." Cohen, supra note 205, at 73.
220 See Small, supra note 205, at 641; Zavon, Trauma as Related to Disease, in
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVORSHIP 213, 222-26 (Beall ed. 1958).
221 See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
222 See note 128 siupra; Malingering and Psychosomatic Reactions, Current Med.,
Sept. 1958, p. 17. See also Morris, Emotional Disturbance in Personal Injury Cases,
21 Dis. NERnv. Sys. 108 (1960). See generally The Neurotic Plaintiff, Current Med.,
Nov. 1956, p. 21.
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the functions of judge and jury, it does not require the attention of those
who accept those rules as fundamentally sound.223 However, to the extent
that it challenges the scientific validity of the "theories" accepted by courts
and juries as the basis of awards within the existing rules, it deserves
consideration.
Scientific criticism may prove to have particular relevance to the pre-
natal injury field. In contrast to many of the cancer, miscarriage, and
neurosis cases, in which the immediate effect of tortious conduct is dis-
cernible, the nature of prenatal injuries makes judge and jury almost totally
dependent on expert testimony to establish causation for the obvious reason
that any external manifestation of injury to the fetus cannot be discerned
until it is delivered sometime later22 The courts have supported their
decisions granting relief for prenatal injuries by general references to recent
strides in medical science, without any analysis of the proper legal sig-
nificance of these strides.22 5  Certainly important additions to medical
knowledge have been made in the recent past; but understanding of the
many complex interactions at work during pregnancy has barely begun.
In the past an injured child may have been hard put to find medical
support for his case; today, theories of causation-none of which can be
confidently rejected as unfounded-are numerous.2 26  It would seem that
the courts' early lack of confidence in the efficacy of the rules of evidence
to protect against unfounded claims was somewhat misplaced, since only
in the very unusual case could any supporting scientific theory of causation
be found. By the same measure, courts today may be incautious and pre-
mature in recognizing a new cause of action. The stage is now set for a
multitude of claims finding support in the current plethora of teratological
theories 2 27 Accordingly, the capacity of the rules of evidence to handle
these claims in an equitable fashion becomes important.
223The competence of judges and juries to weigh expert testimony has been
questioned. See Special Comm. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York,
Report on the Medical Expert Testimony Project, in ImP.RTIAL. MauicAL TESTimoNY
6 (1956); H. Smith, Relatim of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability
for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 198-99 (1944).
:2
2
4 But see note 265 infra. Compare text accompanying notes 214-19 mtpra.
225 See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
226 See, e.g., note 141 supra. Compare the legal position on the question of
causation in the cancer cases. Small, supra note 205.
227 The somewhat bewildering complexity and speculative nature of the proof
issues involved are illustrated by a case in which the mother suffered from diabetes,
Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1951) (civil-
law death action). Obesity, reduced exercise, and infection-all of which can be
brought about by trauma-are factors that can activate diabetes in a hereditarily
predisposed person. See Joslin, The Relation of Trauma to Diabetes, 117 ANN.
SURG. 610, 617 (1943); Traumatic Diabetes, Current Med., Sept. 1955, pp. 14-16.
In Valence, the diabetic mother was obese before the accident but put on additional
weight afterwards, allegedly as a result of the trauma. The fetus, born dead at
full term, weighed fourteen pounds, an extremely excessive amount. Maternal obesity
during pregnancy as such does not increase the size of the fetus. In the resulting
death action the court denied recovery because of failure of proof that the size of the
fetus was caused by the mother's inactivity brought about by the accident. Plaintiff's
attorney could have approached the case from the standpoint of a possible "activation"
effect of the accident on the diabetes. Maternal diabetes is known to cause an en-
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B. Problems of Expert Testimony in Prenatal Injury Cases
1. Criticism of Current Practice
The question of causation in prenatal injury cases, being "beyond the
ken of the average layman," 2 2 8 invariably calls for expert testimony to
establish a prima facie case.9 The unique problem in this regard posed
by the present state of antenatal pediatrics relates solely to the reliability
of the scientific theories of causation which are likely to be proferred. For
present purposes, therefore, discussion can be limited to those rules, relating
to the necessary qualifications of expert witnesses and the admissibility and
sufficiency of their testimony, that focus on this narrow area. Kindred
problems, such as the necessity and content of hypothetical questions and
the status of facts not entailed in the physician's general scientific back-
ground but which form the basis of his expert opinion,2 30 expert opinions
as to "ultimate" facts,23 1 the hearsay rulema and the rule that testimony
largement of fetal size and to increase fetal mortality sharply. See Farquhar, The
Child of the Diabetic Woman, 34 ARCH. Dis. CHILD. 76, 82-83, 95 (1959); Gellis &
Hsia, The Infant of the Diabetic Mother, 97 A.M.A.J. Dis. CHID. 1, 4-6, 20 (1959).
The principal dangers to the newborn infant of a diabetic mother are known to be
hypoglycemia, anoxia, lethargy, abnormal pulmonary ventilation, and prematurity.
MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 228 (1962). The relationship of maternal diabetes
to congenital malformations, however, remains conjectural. Warkany & Kalter, Con-
genital Malformation, 265 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1046, 1047 (1961). See generally
MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 224-31 (1962).
2 2 8 McCORm IcK, EVIDENCE § 13, at 28 (1954).
229 For a discussion of the particular proof problems in different types of prenatal
injury cases, see pp. 565-80 supra.
230 There are a number of annoying problems in this regard which may upset
an expert's opinion, but none of them is especially relevant to prenatal injury cases.
Thus, an expert's opinion may be objected to as resting on a defective foundation when
admitted evidence is not incorporated into a hypothetical question to which it would
be relevant, see Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1460, 1468-78 (1933), when the opinions of other
witnesses (which the jury need not accept) are used in the formulation of the expert's
opinion, see Annot., 98 A.L.R. 1109 (1935), or when statements made to the expert
before trial, and relied upon by him, have not been independently introduced into
evidence, see Annot. 175 A.LR. 274 (1948). See also Hamilton v. Huebner, 146
Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945). All of these objections relate either to the operative
facts of the case at issue or to questions of trial practice involving the danger of
misleading the jury. The unique problem posed by prenatal injury cases relates
solely to the general scientific background of the expert and its dependence on the
current state of antenatal pediatrics. See generally McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE §§ 14-15
(1954).
2 31 Whatever the "rule" forbidding opinion evidence as to the ultimate fact at
issue means, see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 12 (1954), many of its applications have
been criticized, see 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1919-22 (3d ed. 1940); Ladd, Expert
Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 423-26 (1952), and, for practical reasons, it has not
been strictly enforced in the case of medical testimony, see Birmingham Elec. Co. v.
Farmer, 251 Ala. 148, 36 So. 2d 343 (1948) ; Shepherd v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E.2d 156 (1949). In fact, such evidence may be necessary to
sustain a verdict. See Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681
(1954). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 401 (1942).
32 The clear majority rule is that medical treatises are inadmissible as independent
evidence, see, e.g., Gluckstein v. Lipsett, 93 Cal. App. 2d 391, 209 P.2d 98 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1949); Percoco's Case, 273 Mass. 429, 173 N.E. 515 (1930) (compensation
case), although the opposite view has a few adherents, see Barfield v. South High-
lands Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 561, 68 So. 30, 34 (1915); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 529 (1942) ; 6 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1690 (3d ed. 1940) ; cf. Annot., 175 A.L.R.
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must be couched in terms rising to a required level of certainty,233 can be
excluded from discussion. None of them relate primarily to the present
narrow question.
The rules of evidence pertinent to the narrow issue are few in number
and easy to isolate. Whether a proposed expert is qualified to testify is
considered a matter for the trial judge's discretion, reviewable only for
abuse.2 34 Except in unusual cases, courts do not require that an expert
medical witness be a specialist in the field of his proposed testimony in order
to qualify to testify.23 5 And since lack of scientific validity of an expert's
opinion is ordinarily not an adequate ground for excluding his otherwise
admissible testimony,23 6 once the court decides to allow a physician to
274 (1948). In the leading case of Finnegan v. Fall River Gas Works Co., 159 Mass.
311, 34 N.E. 523 (1893), a physician was allowed to rely on medical texts in giving
an opinion as to the effects of a certain kind of asphyxiation, although he had no
personal knowledge of the subject. Mr. Justice Holmes said:
[H]is general competency as an expert seems not to have been questioned;
and, although it might not be admissible merely to repeat what a witness
had read in a book not itself admissible, still, when one who is competent on
the general subject accepts from his reading as probably true a matter of
detail which he has not verified, the fact gains an authority which it would
not have had from the printed page alone, and, subject perhaps to the exercise
of some discretion, may be admitted.
Id. at 312-13, 34 N.E. at 523.
Not all courts have accepted the Holmes position. See CuAnt, LAW AND
MEnic=x 409-11 (1960). Although no prenatal injury cases have posed the Finnegan
issue, it would seem that it would have peculiar applicability to these cases, since most
medical experts will not have had any personal experience in antenatal pediatrics.
The problem involves the personal qualifications of the proposed expert, which is not
the difficult problem posed by medical testimony in prenatal injury cases. It has
been suggested that testimony predicated upon secondary sources should be ad-
missible only where the basis is not wholly hearsay, professional discipline is strong,
the hearsay is especially reliable, and totally acceptable evidence is difficult to
obtain. See Maguire & Hahesy, Requisite Proof of Basis for Expert Opinion, 5
VAND. L. REv. 432 (1952). One of the principal dangers of hearsay is alleviated by
the fact that the expert may be cross-examined as to the sources on which he relies,
and the sources discredited. See Annot, 60 A.L.R.2d 77 (1958). See also Levin,
Evidence, in 1960 ANN. SuRvFy Amr. LAw 554, 571. See generally Maguire & Hahesy,
supra.
233 See notes 213 supra, 237 infra and accompanying text. Certainly this rule
provides a measure of judicial control and some safeguard against unfounded scientific
theories, but only to the extent that it can be assumed that the degree of assurance
of an expert's expressed opinion is a function of the reliability of the scientific theories
on which he relies. The rule alone, however, would seem to be inadequate to handle
the somewhat unique proof problem presented by prenatal injury cases. The merits of
a claim should not be decided on the basis of a subtle rule which may make the liberality
or dogmatism of the particular expert's disposition the controlling variable.
234 2 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 561, at 641 (3d ed. 1940).
2 3 5 McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 13, at 28-29 (1954); 2 WGmoR, EVIDENCE § 569,
at 665 (3d ed. 1940).
2 36 Cf. Isenhour v. State, 157 Ind. 517, 528, 62 N.E. 40, 44 (1901). Beyond
broad statements that objections to the scientific validity of an expert's opinion go
to weight not admissibility, see, e.g., McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 235 S.W.2d
173 (1950), the courts rarely declare the existence of such a rule. Perhaps it should
be described as a rule of practice rather than a rule of law. McCormick says, without
citing any authority, that: "Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a
qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclu-
sion. . . . [such as] prejudicing or misleading the jury . . . ." McCoRsrcK,
EVmENCE § 170, at 363 (1954). Some doubts are raised by cases holding the results
of an experimental procedure inadmissible unless the theory underlying that procedure
is generally accepted as correct. As to lie detectors, for example, see Frye v. United
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testify as an expert, he is customarily allowed to venture any medical opin-
ion, stated with the requisite degree of certainty, s 7 which bears on the
subject of the inquiry. Similarly, when the court decides whether a case
is sufficient to go to the jury, it does not weigh the validity of the scientific
premises of expert opinions in the record; if a qualified witness has testified
with the necessary degree of assurance, there is no question about the legal
sufficiency of the evidence on that point.2ss Notwithstanding possible com-
ment from the bench upon the value and credibility of expert testimony, it
is considered to be within the jury's sole province to weigh expert testi-
mony.2 9 The effect of the present rules, therefore, is that, except in a
flagrant case, once a medical witness is held qualified to testify as an expert,
under the existing permissive test, his opinion, if couched in terms of ade-
quate certainty, will be sufficient to sustain a verdict, no matter how false
its scientific premises. The jury is free to disregard discrediting cross-
examination and a greater number of experts testifying for the other side.
2 4 0
Although the practice of giving plaintiffs great leeway in the choice
of experts has been criticized for allowing too much freedom to "shop
around" for favorable testimony,24 ' the rule may well be a salutary one,
especially in prenatal injury cases. Since very few physicians are presently
qualified as specialists in this new field, a different practice might put most
prenatal injury claims out of court.242 At the same time, the fact that ante-
natal pediatrics is a developing science whose most fundamental hypotheses
are still general and unsettled raises the danger that courts and juries will
give expert opinions in this field more weight than can be justified by
States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See generally McCoRRmicK, EviDExcE § 174
(1954). Insofar as the objection to lie detector tests goes not to the ability of poly-
graphs to trace physiological changes accurately and of operators to read these tracings
knowingly, but only to the validity of the underlying psychological theory that con-
6cious lying produces measurable physiological changes, see Streeter & Belli, The
"Fourth Degree": The Lie Detector, 5 VAND. L. REv. 549, 550 (1952), these cases
are not significantly distinguishable from cases involving expert opinions based on
subjective examination. However, there is an additional problem in the case of
lie detectors: once the machine has "said" the subject is lying, "the jury is likely to
be unduly impressed," id. at 557, ignoring other evidence as to the subject's veracity
and the theoretical limitations of polygraphic examination. Expert opinions based
on the more familiar process of subjective examination, elimination of alternative
explanations, and application of what seems the most appropriate theory is not as
apt to close the jury's mind to argument and evidence tending to cast doubt on the
validity of the theory.
2
7 See 1 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 60, at 382-86 (1954); Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d
1082, 1118 (1959); Annot., 136 A.L.R. 965, 990 (1942).
28 See 2 HARPa & JAMES, ToRTs § 20.2, at 1117-18 (1956).
2 9 Langenfelder v. Thompson, 179 Md. 502, 20 A.2d 491 (1941); Lovich v.
Salvation Army, 81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459 (1947). See generally James,
Suf iciency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47
VA. L. Rv. 218 (1961).
2 40 See Kundiger v. Prudential Ins. Co., 219 Minn. 25, 28-29, 17 N.W.2d 49, 51-52
(1944).
2 4
1 See CuRRAN, LAW AND MEniciNE 394 (1960).
242 Medical specialists tend to congregate in the larger cities; few are willing to
appear in court, particularly as nontreating witnesses called only to evaluate a case
for one side or the other. Ibid.
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premises on which they rest.243  Of course, the problem of weighing the
reliability of evidence is not new to courts and juries.24 It is not uncom-
mon to find personal injury cases in which numerous experts testify for
one party but agree with one another only on the ultimate conclusion.2 45
By admitting and holding sufficient such testimony, courts are giving tacit
recognition to individual and uncorroborated theories; expert opinions are
inherently subjective--particularly in so inexact a science as medicine.246
Clearly this judicial leniency should not be extended blindly to the prenatal
injury area.
The disagreement of medical witnesses in ordinary personal injury
actions quite often centers on the extent of injury, not on questions, such
as cause-in-fact, going to liability itself; and courts are said to be generally
more lenient in accepting evidence as to the extent and severity of the
plaintiff's injuries once some injury (which is necessary to a prima fade
case of liability on a particular claim) has been convincingly shown.
2 4 7
Moreover, expert witnesses in most personal injury cases, although often
disagreeing as to important details, will usually be found to hold certain
fundamental premises in common, unlike experts in the prenatal injury
field, where even the basic authorities are in conflict.248  Finally, in a
typical negligence case, the physical consequences to the plaintiff of the
alleged misconduct are usually immediately discernible-an existing person
has been bruised or cut-and a general cause and effect relationship is
thereby shown which tends to underscore the possible merit of the plain-
tiff's case.O9 In sharp contrast, there are no such signs in prenatal injury
cases; 250 manifestations at birth in no way negate the possible operation
of prior and intervening causes. 251 A prenatal injury case, therefore,
243 See generally H. Smith, supra note 223, at 198-99.
244 It has been estimated, perhaps extravagantly, that seven out of ten personal
injury cases are decided on medical rather than legal considerations. Medical-Legal
Problents and Their Solutions, 165 A.M.A.J. 699, 702 (1957).
245 Medical experts tend to differ in their opinions because the context is adversary,
medicine is an inexact science, and the experts must respond to questions which are
framed to build a legal, not a medical, conclusion. Lamppert, Medical Evidence and
Testimonty, 8 CLEv.-MA.n L. RE v. 465, 471-74 (1959). In some states a problem is
raised because a party is held to be strictly bound by the testimony of his own
experts, it being essential in establishing a prima fade case that there be no absolute
contradictions in their ultimnate conclusions. See, e.g., Mudano v. Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Co., 289 Pa. 51, 137 AtI. 104 (1927) ; Annot, 53 A.L.R.2d 1229 (1957). A
plaintiff can avoid the possible impact of this rule-at the risk of diminishing the
persuasive force of his case-by using only one expert.
246 Courts have expressly recognized this fact. E.g., Blackfoot Coal & Land
Corp. v. Cooper, 121 Ind. App. 313, 322-23, 95 N.E.2d 639, 643 (1950).
247 See 1 BELLI, MODERN TRiALs § 60, at 387-88 (1954) ; McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES
§ 27, at 102 (1935) ; Annot, 78 A.L.R. 858 (1932). This distinction has sometimes
been overlooked. See Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352, 361 (La. Ct. App. 1923)
(civil-law death action); Comment, 12 BAYLOR L. REv. 79, 86-87 (1960).
248 See note 12 .mpra and accompanying text. A specific area of disagreement
concerns the weight to be given the developmental arrest theory. See notes 88-92
smpra and accompanying text.
249 See notes 214-19 supra and accompanying text.
2-50 See note 224 supra and accompanying text.
251 Erving, Medicolegal Problems Concerning the Unborn Child it Pennsylvania,
14 U. Prrr. L. REv. 344, 350-51 (1953).
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presents dangers not present when a court admits medical testimony that
simply gives scientific plausibility to a recognizable factual complex
amenable to lay explanation. 2 52 And the fact that an immediate factual
correlation between the injury to the mother and the injury to the fetus
is impossible has the obvious practical effect that a plaintiff in a prenatal
injury action will often be forced to rely almost exclusively on medical
testimony, without being able to point to any "external circumstances."
In view of the judiciary's preoccupation with the problem of proof
of causation in prenatal injury cases, it is remarkable how few cases have
dealt specifically with the relationship of the rules of evidence to the medical
opinions advanced 53 In part this may be explained by the fact that many
of the reported cases were settled without trial after an appellate court de-
cided that a cause of action existed.2 54 In others, the question of admis-
sibility and sufficiency of the evidence was apparently not raised, and the
appellate courts were reluctant to discuss or decide these issues as matters
of law. In some cases, however, the courts appear to have allowed damages
to be granted on theories that should not have been accepted because of their
lack of scientific validity.255 These courts can be criticized for failing to see
or making short shrift of the evidential problems involved.
2. A New Departure
An interesting exception to this pattern of judicial neglect is Puhl v.
Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co.,256 which illustrates the two evidential problems
252 See notes 211-12 supra and accompanying text.
253 There are a few cases dealing with this point. See Orgeron v. Hourgettes,
67 So. 2d 747 (La. Ct App. 1953) (insufficient proof connecting asphyxiation with
death of fetus); Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct
App. 1951) (insufficient proof that accident caused stillbirth); Durivage v. Tufts,
94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947) (lack of medical testimony on cause of premature
child's death). See also Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 459, 26 A.2d 489, 684
(Ct. Err. & App. 1942) (concurring opinion).
254 An excellent illustration is Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960),
in which the plaintiff was allegedly born a Mongoloid as a result of an automobile
accident during the fourth week of pregnancy. The court, adopting the biological
approach, see note 65 supra and accompanying text, overruled preliminary objections
to the child's claim. Mr. Justice Bell, dissenting, regretted that the majority had
not paid more attention to the medical problems involved. He concluded that medical
science has learned little about the cause of Mongolism during the last twenty years
and "that leading medical authorities are agreed (a) that a Mongoloid child is a
Mongoloid from the time of its conception and results from the genes of the parents,
and (b) that trauma cannot cause a child to become or be born a Mongoloid." 401
Pa. at 277, 164 A.2d at 98.
255 Of these, only a few can be termed patently unjust in that plaintiff failed to
Ishow adequate medical causation. Although a confident classification on the basis
of fragmentary reporting of medical facts and testimony is difficult, likely candidates
for this dubious distinction are: Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga.
504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960);
Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) ; Van Elbe v. Studebaker-Packard
Corp., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 635 (C.P. 1958); Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227
(C.P. 1924); Montreal Tramways Co. v. lAveill6, [1933] Can. Sup. Ct. 456, [1933]
4 D.L.R. 337 (1933); cf. Young v. Western & Ati. R.R., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E.
414 (1929) (mother's anguish about child being born with birthmarks over its eyes
element of damages where defendant shined a flashlight in her eyes while she was
in bed).
256 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959).
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of peculiar importance in prenatal injury cases: the current unreliability
of the scientific theories on which a plaintiff must rely to establish a prima
facie case and the fact that the chain of events set in motion by the defend-
ant's negligent act which allegedly resulted in the prenatal injury is in-
capable of foundation proof.
In Puhl a woman twelve weeks pregnant was involved in an auto
accident, receiving injuries to her head, shoulders, chest, and both knees,
and bruises generally over her body. She was not hospitalized, but was
treated by a physician in her home where she remained in bed for eight
days. In due course she gave birth to a Mongoloid baby. The mother
was forty-six years old at the time of the pregnancy, and there had been
no previous history of Mongolism in either of the parents' families. An
action was brought on behalf of the child for the impairment of her physical
and mental faculties as a result of the accident.
At trial plaintiff's expert witness testified that Mongolism could be
caused by a fetal oxygen deficiency about the thirteenth week of pregnancy
and, on this thesis, it was his opinion to a reasonable medical certainty
that the accident caused the child to be born Mongoloid. His explanation
was based on Ingalls' theory that lack of oxygen to the fetus would damage
the formation of brain tissue and result in permanent damage.257  Applying
the theory to the particular facts of the case, the expert opined that the
mother's injuries could have loosened her placenta, thereby producing a
fetal oxygen deficiency. He also said that the mother's emotional upset
would affect the adrenal cortical glands and swamp her blood with
hormones which would act as a brake upon the child's development.258
Defendant's expert testified that the cause of Mongolism is not known
although there are many theories as to its etiology.259 In his opinion it
257The basis of Ingalls' hypothesis is the developmental arrest theory. See
notes 88-90 upra and accompanying text. The physical abnormalities that accompany
the brain damage must occur during the third month of pregnancy; it is postulated
therefore that Mongolism is caused at that time, oxygen deficiency being a causative
agent along with perhaps other more subtle factors. It is interesting to note that
under this theory the thirteenth week is a little late in the pregnancy for Mongolism
to come about-although it is not impossible. See Ingalls, Etiology of Mongolism,
74 Amiun J. Dis. CanLD. 147 (1947); Ingalls, The Pathogeneis of Motgolism, 73
A mxa. J. Dis. Csnln. 279 (1947). But cf. Smith & McKeown, Pre-Natal Growth
of Mongoloid Defectives, 30 AacH. Dis. CrLr. 257, 258 (1955), where it is suggested
that the retardation of growth may be due to a lowered growth capacity of the fetus-
which may be genetically caused-rather than to the inability of the prenatal environ-
ment to support its growth.
2 5sThe fact that Ingalls did not take into account the alarm reaction, see note
142 stpra and accompanying text, in postulating the relationship between stress and
developmental arrests was the basis of Fraser's criticism of this hypothesis in his
letter in 162 A.M.A.J. 1651 (1956). Ingalls replied that his theory was not meant
to be a complete explanation and that his findings were published for the reason that
it is better to have a fundamental hypothesis with which to work and for which
there is some supporting evidence than nothing at all. 163 A.M.A.J. 771 (1957).
The testimony of plaintiffs expert on this point must be considered entirely speculative.
259 Defendant's expert was, of course, medically correct in this statement. See
BENDA, THE CniLD WiTH MoNGoLism 188-227 (1960). The developmental arrest
theory is not a sufficient explanation. It does not square with the recent discovery
that an additional chromosome is associated with Mongolism. See note 73 supra.
It does not account for the fact that the average maternal age at the time of birth
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was caused solely by hereditary factors. He emphasized the fact that
the mother's age is of great importance in predicting Mongolism. Although
he did not repudiate Ingalls' views, he characterized them as nothing more
than a "theory."
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin took the position that at most the
evidence showed that under one theory of the cause of Mongolism it was
possible for the mother's injury to have produced the child's damage. It
emphasized the defense's point that the cause of Mongolism is unknown but
that even if Ingalls' explanation were assumed to be correct, plaintiff had
presented no testimony of an impaired functioning of the placenta whereby
the supply of oxygen to the fetus was reduced. The court therefore con-
cluded that since the explanation of the cause of Mongolism offered by
plaintiff's expert was not shown by clear and convincing evidence to be
the consensus of medical and scientific opinion, the case failed because the
evidence as to causation was insufficient as a matter of law. It went on to
say:
True, there is usually no requirement that before an expert may
give an opinion he must demonstrate that most, or all, or many,
other experts would agree with his opinion. However, the medical
testimony given here is not of an expert in this field of medicine,
and his opinion was based on the views of one authority out of
several. When scientific or medical theories or explanations
have not crossed the line and become an accepted medical fact,
opinions based thereon are no stronger or convincing than the
theories. While this court has gone a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from well-recognized scientific and
medical principles or discoveries, nevertheless, the facts from
which the opinion is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular medical field in which
they belong. Otherwise, the opinion is based not on facts but
conjecture.26
Although the court may have gone somewhat too far in its legal rea-
soning,261 the Puhl case demonstrates a refreshing awareness of the prob-
lems involved, and its holding as to the testimony in question accords with
present medical knowledge.32  Insofar as the court's position rested on the
fact that plaintiff's witness was not "an expert"-if the court would have
is nearly ten years greater in the case of Mongoloids than it is in the case of random
births. See NELsoN, PEDIARcs 1132 (7th ed. 1959). See generally MONTAGUJ, PRE-
NATAL IxrLuENcEs 113-24 (1962). And it is greatly weakened by the fact that when
Mongolism is associated with twin births, it almost always affects both twins when
they are identical but rarely affects both when they are fraternal. See ibid. See also
text accompanying notes 102-04 supra.
260 8 Wis. 2d at 353-54, 99 N.W.2d at 169. (Emphasis added.)
261 General scientific acceptance is the usual standard for judicial notice. See
McCoRmicz, EViDE cE § 325 (1954).
262 See note 259 supra.
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reached the opposite result had Dr. Ingalls himself been plaintiff's wit-
ness 263-it seems to draw a peculiar line. But the context from which that
statement is taken indicates that what the court was worried about was not
so much the personal qualifications of the individual expert-plaintiff's
witness had in fact made studies of Mongoloids both in the United States
and Europe-but the qualifications of any member of the medical profession
to testify to a matter admittedly within the realm of scientific speculation.
This, of course, is the basic problem of these cases, and the court set down
a criterion of "clear and convincing evidence" of a consensus of scientific
opinion.2 4 Whether the court's test goes to the admissibility or sufficiency
of the evidence is not clear; but its practical effect is to raise a plaintiff's
burden of proof of causation over that usually required in tort actions.
The court also was aware of a second crucial issue in these cases: it
emphasized that even if Ingalls' theory be taken as true, no evidence had
been introduced to show an impaired functioning of the placenta. It is
difficult to see any merit in this position. If such evidence were strictly
required, most prenatal injury suits would be lost, even if the basis of the
theory of causation set forth was in accord with general scientific opinion:
for it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain evidence of this kind of fact.265
It is likely, however, that the Puhl court would not have held for the de-
2 63 Dr. Ingalls did testify in one case which resulted in a verdict of $15,000 to
compensate a two-year-old microcephalic child for her defect which allegedly resulted
from an accident during the fifth month of pregnancy. He testified that he was
"reasonably certain" that the child's handicap was a result of the accident. The verdict
was reached by a 10-to-2 vote after five hours of deliberation. It was attacked as
inadequate on a motion for a new trial solely on the issue of damages. See New
Medical Evidence on Prenatal Injury, Current Med., Sept. 1957, p. 32. The court
agreed that the verdict was inadequate, but dismissed the motion on procedural
grounds. Meyers v. Mohr, 1 Misc. 2d 776, 148 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. 1955). While
the court did not discuss the sufficiency of the evidence, it is likely that although
plaintiff's medical testimony may have been sufficient to take the case to the jury,
it did not entirely satisfy the jury and the result was a compromise verdict, for the
award was totally inadequate by present standards. See, e.g., Sox v. United States,
187 F. Supp. 465, 469 (E.D.S.C. 1960) ($260,000 under Federal Tort Claims Act for
severe brain injury); 2 BEm.Ii, MonR-x DAmAGEs § 267 (1954).
264Not only in this requirement, but also in its demand that a consensus be
proved by "clear and convincing evidence," see McCORmicK, EVIDENCE § 320 (1954),
the court departed from traditional principles; the usual test in tort cases is the pre-
ponderance of the evidence, PRossE, TORTS § 41, at 197 (2d ed. 1955). It would
not be surprising, when the historical development of the cause of action for prenatal
injuries is considered, if some courts, while allowing a cause of action, adopted a
strict attitude on the sufficiency of proof; indeed, the fact that Puhl is a departure
from the usual approach is the surprising thing. See note 255 .upra and accompanying
text Compare the emphasis put on the burden of proof in Valence v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847, 850-52 (La. Ct. App. 1951) (civil-law death
action); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953). "A cate-
gorical prohibition of attempts at proof [under the old rule as to prenatal injuries]
must . . . be justified upon an assumption that false but legally sufficient evidence
will be not only offered but also accepted by the tribunal . . . more often than true
evidence will be." 2 HARPER & JAMms, ToRTs § 18.3, at 1029 (1956). Perhaps a
few of the courts that now allow recovery remain concerned with this danger.
265A disrupted placenta can be evidenced in most cases only by uterine bleeding.
But traumatic bleeding does not necessarily indicate that the fetal oxygen supply is
impaired. Many normal children have been born of mothers who hemorrhaged
severely during pregnancy. Important factors are the amount of blood lost, the
duration of the bleeding, and whether the fetus exhibited any signs of cerebral anoxia,
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fendant on this ground alone. As theories of causation become more gen-
erally accepted by the medical profession, when a general cause and effect
relationship can be shown on the basis of clearly reliable scientific authority,
future courts following the Puhl approach may well do away with this and
related requirements of detailed proof on a rationale somewhat akin to that
demonstrated in the "external circumstances" cases.26 6 In the last analysis,
therefore, increasing reliability of the pertinent medical theories will likely
be the dynamic factor in influencing judicial response to both problems
raised by the Puhl court.
3. A Suggested Approach
The existing rules as presently administered are inadequate to handle
the somewhat unique problems now posed by prenatal injury cases. The
only judicial scrutiny of scientific theory for which they provide relates to
the personal qualifications of proposed experts. But the problem presented
by antenatal pediatrics is a more basic one, posing the question whether,
at the present time, any member of the medical profession is qualified to
testify, since medical science itself often cannot buttress his testimony with
anything better than unsettled theories. The Puhl case, up to the present
time the only one that has openly recognized and dealt with the problem,
points the way to a possible solution. If the court said anything it clearly
said that a scientific theory is not legally validated simply because a
physician is willing to base an opinion on it. It is not clear, however, where
the court was drawing the line. On the one hand, it spoke of general
scientific acceptance, which is the usual criterion for judicial notice.26 7 But
this clearly is too strict a test; few, if any, prenatal injury cases could suc-
ceed if plaintiffs were required to introduce proof rising to such a level of
certainty. On the other hand, the tenor of the opinion seems to indicate
that what the court was requiring was proof that the theory in question was
the consensus of medical opinion in the field. This test seems to encompass
not only established facts but propositions as to which there is substantial
agreement among experts, even though they have not been scientifically
established. This test is probably the most liberal one that could be
reconciled with the conception of cause espoused by the scientific method.
Even this test, however, would seem too strict to meet the realities of
everyday tort litigation; to require the plaintiff to show that the medical
theory of causation upon which he relies is the consensus of medical opin-
such as increased activity at the time of the placental separation. See Current De-
velopments in Medical Proof of Prenatal Injury, Current Med., Nov. 1960, p. 30. In
most other cases, there is absolutely no objective evidence upon which medical infer-
ences can be drawn. X-rays are not usually helpful and can be dangerous, see note
172 supra, although they may be useful in some instances to give added weight to
scientific conclusions, see, e.g., Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465, 467 (E.D.
S.C. 1960) (fetal head shown to have been at locus of maternal injury).
266 See notes 214-19 supra and accompanying text.
267 See text accompanying note 260 supra.
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ion would impose a nearly impossible burden and in practical effect fore-
close almost all prenatal injury recoveries.28 8
At the same time, however, the present judicial attitude of ignoring the
evidential problems raised by a field in which the literature demonstrates
that there is a great danger of recoveries being won on the basis of
hypotheses of causation which have no foundation in the kind of reality with
which courts are familiar suggests that it is desirable that some safeguard
be employed. Perhaps the rule making testimony as to mere "possibilities"
inadequate should serve to eliminate the most questionable evidence in this
area;269 but if the post hoc criticisms of responsible medical writers
2 7 0
are reliable, they suggest that this rule has not served well enough. One
might hope that pointing out the problem and urging an increased aware-
ness of it on the part of judges would be enough. One wonders, however,
how courts which once seemed so worried about fraudulent claims being
made out on the basis of speculative evidence could make such short work
of this problem in reviewing actual recoveries, where the record of the
evidence is before them. It would seem that some articulated rule is neces-
sary; perhaps the present overly permissive attitude will respond to the very
process of trying to formulate a satisfactory rule.
A more equitable test than those suggested by the Puhl opinion might
require the plaintiff to show that the medical theory upon which his case
rests is accepted by a recognized school of scientific thought. In order
to maintain a necessary degree of flexibility, it is probably desirable to lay
down no more rigid test than this. It would require that a reasonable
number of qualified physicians accept the theory in question as scientifically
reliable or at least be willing to recognize that its exponent is a foremost
authority in the relevant field of inquiry 2 71 and himself accepts the theory as
more than just a tentative suggestion2 72 This kind of test is obviously more
lenient than the "consensus" test derived from Puhl in that it does not
require majority support, it leaves room for substantial disagreement among
different schools of experts, and it allows causation to be made out if the
facts are consistent with the views of a preeminent expert.2 73 It is fairer
268 How many physicians are needed to make a consensus? How does a plaintiff
go about proving that the required number of physicians accept the theory in question?
How does one define the relevant area of specialty in which the consensus is to be
sought?
269 See note 233 supra.
270 See notes 128, 220-22 supra and accompanying text.
271 Compare UNiFom RULE OF EVIDENCE 56(2) (b), which requires that the
judge affirmatively find that the proposed expert opinion is "within the scope of the
special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the witness" before it
is admissible.
272 The developmental arrest theory would clearly satisfy the latter part of the
requirement because of the renown of its chief exponent, Ingalls. However, insofar
as Ingalls does not accept his own theory without major qualifications, see note 258
supra, the proposed test would allow the result reached by the Puhl court in a case
of maternal injury allegedly resulting in infantile Mongolism, see note 259 supra.2 3s It would be impractical to require that the preeminent expert himself be
obtained to testify in every case. Since antenatal pediatrics is not really an area of
practice but of specialized research, few physicians will be able to testify from personal
experience in the area, although most competent obstetricians and pediatricians would
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to the defendant than the present practice in applying at least some sort of
control and making more meaningful the safeguard of scientific discipline.
274
All of the procedural difficulties in applying this tentative suggestion
cannot be foreseen; fewer can be resolved here. Conceptually, the test
cuts across the qualification, admissibility, and sufficiency stages, and its
adoption will have to include some choice among these stages for its most
satisfactory application. Once this kind of test is accepted, its use should
be guided by judicial convenience: it is certainly a waste of the court's
time to admit evidence which cannot be permitted to support a verdict;
yet adequate scrutiny of the content of proffered testimony at the admis-
sibility stage may disrupt the proceedings too much to be a significant
saving. For present purposes, it is perhaps sufficient to emphasize again
that the current tide of prenatal injury claims combined with the existing
state of scientific knowledge in the field of antenatal pediatrics raises a
serious evidential problem of which courts have not heretofore taken ade-
quate cognizance. Although the suggested test seems to be a satisfactory
compromise in many respects, any rule of law which would impel trial
courts to take a closer look at the scientific theories offered in these cases
would seem preferable to current practice.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The old rule denying relief for prenatal injuries was in large part
based upon the fear of courts that the lack of reliable medical knowledge as
to causation would permit a host of fictitious claims. Scientific advance-
ments have caused the courts to change their attitude. But this shift,
although welcome, is proceeding more rapidly and encompassing larger
areas of recovery than can be justified in the light of the existing uncertainty
and flux of medical knowledge. Although great advances have been made,
they have been from a position of almost total ignorance. At present, very
few environmental teratogenic agents have been conclusively established to
be effective in the prenatal period.
At the present time, except in a minority of congenital deformity cases,
recovery should not be allowed for prenatal injuries allegedly resulting from
post-first-trimester accidents.
The viability limitation in prenatal injury cases is headed for oblivion.
Courts are coming to realize that it is illogical and unjust to the children
affected and not readily amenable to scientific proof.
be familiar with learning in the field. This would seem to be an appropriate situ-
ation in which to adopt the liberal approach to "scientific hearsay" espoused by
Finnegan v. Fall River Gas Works Co., 159 Mass. 311, 34 N.E. 523 (1893). See
note 232 supra.
274 Compare note 232 upra. If the plaintiff's witness is permitted to establish
by his own testimony the fact that the theory on which he bases his opinion meets
the proposed test, the test would probably be not much more effective than current
procedures. Therefore, the plaintiff should be required to make some other demon-
strative showing of the status of the theory in medical circles. Citation in leading
medical texts of the proposed theory as that of a recognized school or of its exponent
as a foremost authority should suffice, and the court should be willing to admit such
texts as independent evidence for this limited purpose.
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The scope of liability under the present prenatal injury rule is as broad
as the present competence of medical science to establish the fact of causa-
tion. It will be subject to further widening in response to the expansion
of medical knowledge.
In the future, due to a probable widening of the scope of liability,
prenatal injury cases may be expected to raise issues in two tangential areas
of the law. First, they may have the effect of impeding the abandonment
of the old domestic relations rule, as courts must face the prospect of
maternal liability to unborn children. Second, as medical theories of etiol-
ogy become accepted and there is no longer any great problem as to proof
of cause-in-fact, the courts will be forced to answer some difficult questions
as to what constitutes negligent conduct-particularly in the emotional dis-
turbance field. New standards of proximate cause may be developed in
this context to deny liability. But in the long run, it is not unlikely that
further advances of medical knowledge will ultimately force the merger of
the causes of action for prenatal injuries and emotional disturbance-the
two fields where the courts for so long feared the danger of fictitious claims
-so that an infant will be able to recover damages from one who caused
him injury in utero by upsetting his mother's emotions.
The current proliferation of relatively unsubstantiated theories of the
etiology of congenital defects, coupled with the absence of supporting
external effects which is characteristic of these cases, creates serious evi-
dential problems that most courts have so far ignored. The early signs of
an increasing judicial awareness of these problems tend to indicate that
medical experts who testify as to cause-in-fact in prenatal injury cases will
soon become subject to less permissive rules than those ordinarily applicable
to personal injury cases. A rule that a medical expert's opinion as to
cause-in-fact will not support a verdict unless it is consistent with the views
of a recognized school of scientific thought seems to be an appropriate one
for these cases. A greater acquaintance by counsel and courts with the
status of medical science would seem to be a necessary corollary.
C.A.L.
19621
